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Freedom House of journalistic neutrality are fraudulent and self-serving. There is, he contends, no difference between his role and the role of a chief editor of Reuters or the Associated Press. In one inter- view, Kiselyov equated those two news services with Rossiya Segodnya: “Both are propaganda agencies—they shape the dominant narrative and tell their audiences what and how to think." He continued: “In today’s world, information— how it is gathered, analyzed, interpreted and processed ... pushes a value system, certain views on good and evil, and shapes attitudes to different events."” 7. Theirrelevance of truth: “For the Soviets, the idea of truth was important—even when they were lying,” Peter Pomerantsev has written. “So- viet propaganda went to great lengths to ‘prove’ that the Kremlin's theories or bits of information were fact.” By contrast, in today’s Russia the idea of truth is seen as irrelevant and “the borders between fact and fiction have become utterly blurred.” Pomerantsev quotes Russia's deputy minister of communications as admonishing journalism students at Moscow State Univer- sity to forget about high ideals. “We should give students a clear understanding: They are going to work for The Man, and The Man will tell them what to write, what not to write, and how this or that thing should be written.”® Russian propaganda outlets, especially RT, derive their influence from a clever blend of act and faction, mixing reports on genuine events with exagger- ations, biased coverage, and outright lies. And this mixture of fact and fiction is presented with modern production techniques that mimic cred- ible outlets like the BBC. Propaganda works The idea that governments can influence events through propaganda once seemed far-fetched in the internet age. Developments in Ukraine, however, have spurred a reassessment of propaganda’s role in setting the stage for intervention abroad and repression at home. According to numerous accounts in the international media, many Russians believe that the Ukrainian gov- ernment is responsible for massive war crimes, includ- ing the crucifixion of small children and the downing of the Malaysian Airlines passenger jet.? Many of the wildest assertions have been reinforced by altered or repurposed images that allegedly depict Ukrainian atrocities but actually show events in Mexico, Syria, lraq, or other zones of civil conflict. Ordinary Russians and many Ukrainian consumers of Russian media have told foreign journalists of fears that “fascism” has come to power in Ukraine.*® In George Orwell's dystopian novel 1984, the Ministry of Truth advanced what today would be called a re- gime narrative, with accounts of never-ending conflict abroad and treasonous enemies within. In similar fashion, though with considerably more finesse and sophistication than was described in Orwell's master- piece, Russian media today preach a strident message of external encirclement by Russophobes in Ukraine, the Baltics, Georgia, and elsewhere, and internal fifth-columnists among bloggers, civil society organi- zations, and advocates of gay rights. The media in democracies, especially in Europe, proved unprepared for the deluge of Russian propa- ganda during and after the seizure of Crimea. Putin was thus able to drum home the portrayal of Ukraine as a “divided state” or an “artificial state,” labels that could be attached to many sovereign nations, Russia included." Few were ready to mount a challenge to the Russian proposition that Ukraine's status was unique, and was a legitimate cause for Russia's concern and even a justification for war. The Russian propaganda machine also zeroed in on Ukraine's sup- posed lack of respect for minority rights, a problem that Moscow had not raised during the administra- tions of Viktor Yanukovych or Leonid Kuchma. Neither Ukrainians nor informed observers in the outside world believed that Ukraine was faced with a civil war. This was entirely a creation of Moscow's propaganda and active intervention. Russia's government is not alone in its use of propa- ganda to further its interests. But it is uniquely aggres- sive in pressing the dominant theme of the moment and the most effective in mimicking the idioms of modern commercial media while doing so. Further- more, as the country faces serious decay in economic and other material terms, the Kremlin sees success in the war of information as critical to Russias identity as a great power. Other authoritarian regimes will take note of Russia's successes, and act accordingly. In past eras, dictators’ instrument of choice was cen- sorship. However, people understood that they were being cheated when the authorities banned books and prosecuted those who possessed “unauthorized literature.” Under a modern propaganda regime, www.freedomhouse.org 17 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019251