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BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians system. This form of digital totalitarianism would allow the state to gather information on Chinese citizens from a variety of sources and use it to maintain scores or rankings based on an individual's perceived trust- worthiness, including on political matters. Chinese officials have claimed that by 2020, the system will “allow the trustworthy to roam everywhere under heaven while making it hard for the discredited to take a single step.”! A citizen could receive bad marks for petitioning the government, participating in protests, or circulating banned ideas on social media. As for Russia, the Kremlin complemented its covert in- terference overseas with open and ugly acts of repres- sion at home. In one brief period in early 2017, Russian opposition politician Aleksey Navalny was blocked from competing in the 2018 presidential contest through a trumped-up criminal conviction, dissident journalist Vladimir Kara-Murza nearly died from his second sus- pected poisoning, and the Russian parliament passed a law to decriminalize domestic violence that results in “minor harm" such as small lacerations and bruising. Proponents of the domestic abuse law hailed it as a win for traditional family values. The confluence of authoritarian gains and setbacks for democracy suggest a number of conclusions: 1. Modern authoritarianism is a permanent and increasingly powerful rival to liberal democracy as the dominant governing system of the 21st century. Variations on the systems that have proved effective in suppressing political dissent and pluralism in Russia and China are less likely to collapse than traditional authoritarian states, given their relative flexibility and pragmatism. 2. The most serious threat to authoritarian systems lies in economic breakdown. However, Russia, China, and other major autocracies have shown themselves capable of surviving economic set- backs that, while affecting the standard of living, did not push citizens to the limits of endurance. The catastrophic case of Venezuela is a notable exception. Of the main countries examined in this study, only in Venezuela did the political lead- ership attempt to impose a socialist economic system and wage war on the private sector. 3. Illiberalism in democratic environments is more than a temporary problem that can be fixed through an inevitable rotation of power. In Hun- gary, the Fidesz government has instituted poli- cies that make it difficult for opposition parties to raise funds or present their political message, creating a structurally uneven political playing field. Other elected leaders with authoritarian mindsets will take notice and follow suit. . Authoritarian states are likely to intensify efforts to influence the political choices and govern- ment polices of democracies. The pressure will vary from country to country, but it will become increasingly difficult to control due to global economic integration, new developments in the delivery of propaganda, and sympathetic leaders and political movements within the de- mocracies. Putin and his cohorts have learned well how to use democratic openness against democracy itself. . Authoritarian leaders can count on an increas- ingly vocal group of admirers in democratic states. For several years now, European parties of the nationalistic right and anticapitalist left have forged ties with Moscow and aligned their goals with Putin's. The 2016 U.S. presidential election revealed a new constituency, albeit small, that harbors respect for Putin despite his hostility to American interests and his in- terference in the country’s democratic process. A disturbing number of advisers to the Trump campaign, including Trump himself, expressed admiration for Putin and his system. In addition, various political figures and commentators have praised or come to the defense of despotic rulers including Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Bashar al-Assad. . Modern authoritarians can be expected to dou- ble down on their drive to neuter civil society as an incubator of reformist ideas and political initiatives. Civil society can serve as a vibrant alternative to mainstream democratic parties as those parties fall prey to corruption, elitism, and ossification. After the Kremlin effectively defanged the collection of human rights organi- zations, conservation projects, election monitors, and anticorruption committees in Russia, other autocrats and illiberal leaders began to act in similar fashion. Both Viktor Orban in Hungary and the leaders of the Law and Justice party in Poland have spoken of “bringing order" to the nongov- ernmental sector, though serious restrictions on freedom of association have yet to be adopted by an EU state. That could change in 2017. 58 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019292