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The Rise of the NSA | 207 to know about the data they contained. These compartments were the final line of defense against an inside intruder. In 2009, Snowden, as we know, found his way into the NSA through a temporary job with an outside contractor that was work- ing for the NSA’s Technology Directorate to repair and update its backup system. Four years later, by maneuvering to get hired by another outside contractor with access to the NSA’s sources and methods, he was able to steal secrets stored in isolated computers bearing directly on the ongoing intelligence war. Snowden also copied from these compartments in a matter of weeks, as has been previously mentioned, the NSA’s Level 3 sources and methods used against Russia, Iran, and China. The Snowden breach demonstrated that the NSA’s envelope of secrecy was at best illusory. After this immense loss, the NSA’s sources inside these adversary countries were largely compromised, even if they were not closed down. Once these adversaries were in a position to know what chan- nels the NSA was intercepting, they could use these same channels to mislead U.S. intelligence. A former top intelligence official told ) me, “The queen on our chessboard had been taken.” © The NSA moved to mitigate the damage and find new ways of obtaining unexpected intelligence. In June 2014, the new NSA direc- tor, Rogers, had to confront flagging morale that, according to Gen- eral Hayden, was near paralyzing the intelligence service. Rogers recognized that as a direct result of the Snowden breach, “the nation has lost capabilities against adversaries right now who are attempt- ing to actively undermine us.” But even with that loss, he observed, “the sky has not fallen.” As in the Chicken Little fable he cited, the world had not ended for the NSA. Nor had it ended for the multibillion-dollar outsoure- ing enterprise it superintended. The NSA might have lost many of its sources, or “capabilities,” but Rogers held out hope that new sources could eventually be found to replace them. Compromised codes, after all, could be changed. New technological methods could be devised. New vulnerabilities could also be targeted in enemy ter- ritories. Although repairing the damage might take many “decades,” according to Michael McConnell, the vice-chairman of Booz Allen, the new director had to get on with that task. McConnell, a for- | | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r1.indd 207 ® 9/3016 8:13AM | | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_019695