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Extracted Text (OCR)
238 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS
sian KGB and SVR reported that Chinese intelligence received from
Russia a continuous stream of communications intelligence about
the United States in the late twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies. Russia’s intelligence resources during this period were for-
midable. They included geosynchronous satellites, listening stations
in Cuba, sleeper agents, and embassy-based spy networks. Presum-
ably, this relationship further deepened under President Putin’s
regime. Putin asserted in speeches in 2014 that Russia and China
continued to share a key strategic objective: countering the United
States’ domination of international relations, or what Putin terms
“a unipolar world order.” China’s president, Xi Jinping, expressed a
very similar view, saying in 2014 ina thinly veiled reference to the
United States that any attempt to “monopolize” international affairs
will not succeed.
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been the major supplier
of almost all of China’s modern weaponry. It licenses for manufac-
ture in China avionics, air defense systems, missile launchers, stealth
technology, and submarine warfare equipment. To make these arms
) effective, it also provides China with up-to-date intelligence about ®
the ability of the United States and its allies to counter them. While
such intelligence cooperation may be limited by the reality that
China and Russia still compete in many areas, they still have reason
to share much of the fruits of their cyber and conventional espio-
nage against the NSA in accordance with their intelligence. After all,
the NSA works to intercept the military and political secrets of both
these allies. Moreover, as the CIA’s former deputy director Morell
points out in his book, NSA secrets are a form of currency for adver-
saries in the global intelligence war, saying that part of Snowden’s
cache could be traded by a country that acquired it to the intelligence
services of Iran and North Korea.
Snowden’s stay in Hong Kong from May 20 to June 23 in 2013
made the Chinese intelligence service, willy-nilly, a potential player
in whatever game he was involved in. China’s full responsibility for
Hong Kong’s national security and foreign affairs includes moni-
toring foreign intelligence operatives. Chinese intelligence main-
| | Epst_9780451494566_2p_all_r.indd 238 ® 9/3016 8:13AM | |
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