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inherited it did not make his feelings warmer or inspire him to want to dwell on it further.
He knew the war was cursed and, knowing that, felt no need to know more. He put the
responsibility for it on two of his favorite people to blame: Bush and Obama.
For Bannon, Afghanistan represented one more failure of establishment thinking. More
precisely, it represented the establishment’s inability to confront failure.
Curiously, McMaster had written a book on exactly this subject, a scathing critique of
the unchallenged assumptions with which military leaders pursued the Vietnam War. The
book was embraced by liberals and the establishment, with whom, in Bannon’s view,
McMaster had become hopelessly aligned. And now—ever afraid of the unknown, intent
on keeping options open, dedicated to stability, and eager to protect his establishment cred
—McMaster was recommending a huge troop surge in Afghanistan.
7 OK Ok
By early July, the pressure to make a decision was approaching the boiling point. Trump
had already authorized the Pentagon to deploy the troop resources it believed were
needed, but Defense Secretary Mattis refused to act without a specific authorization from
the president. Trump would finally have to make the call—unless he could find a way to
put it off again.
Bannon’s thought was that the decision could be made for the president—a way the
president liked to have decisions made—if Bannon could get rid of McMaster. That would
both head off the strongest voice for more troops and also avenge Bannon’s ouster by
McMaster’s hand from the NSC.
With the president promising that he would make up his mind by August, and
McMaster, Mattis, and Tillerson pressing for a decision as soon as possible, Bannon-
inspired media began a campaign to brand McMaster as a globalist, interventionist, and all
around not-our-kind-of-Trumper—and, to boot, soft on Israel.
It was a scurrilous, albeit partly true, attack. McMaster was in fact talking to Petraeus
often. The kicker was the suggestion that McMaster was giving inside dope to Petraeus, a
pariah because of his guilty plea regarding his mishandling of classified information. It
was also the case that McMaster was disliked by the president and on the point of being
dismissed.
It was Bannon, riding high again, enjoying himself in a moment of supreme
overconfidence.
Indeed, in part to prove there were other options beyond more troops or humiliating
defeat—and logically there probably weren’t more options—Bannon became a sponsor of
Blackwater-founder Erik Prince’s obviously self-serving idea to replace the U.S. military
force with private contractors and CIA and Special Operations personnel. The notion was
briefly embraced by the president, then ridiculed by the military.
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