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215 The final choice he was made to board a non-stop flight to Moscow on June 23, 2013. To remain in Hong Kong once a criminal complaint was leveled against him would have meant that, at the very minimum, Hong Kong authorities would seize him and the alleged stolen property of the US government in his possession. Even if he was released on bail, the Hong Kong authorities would almost certainly retain all the NSA and GCHQ files he had gone to such lengths to steal. He also would not be allowed to leave Hong Kong and possibly denied any access to the Internet. As he demonstrated by his subsequent actions, this option was not acceptable to him. Once the U.S. criminal complaint was unsealed on June 21, 2013, which became all but inevitable after his video, his only route out of Hong Kong went through two adversaries of the United States, China and Russia. China, as far as is known, did not offer him sanctuary. According to one U.S diplomat, it may have already obtained copies of Snowden’s NSA files, and did not want the problem of having Snowden defect to Beijing. In any case, if it had not already acquired the files. It could assume it would receive that intelligence data from its Russian ally in the intelligence war. Whatever its reason, China did not use its considerable power in Hong Kong to block Snowden’s exit. Nor did Snowden obtain a visa to any country in Latin America or elsewhere during his month- long stay in Hong Kong. As in the oft-cited Sherlock Holmes’ clue of the dog that did not bark, Snowden’s lack of any visas in his passport strongly suggests that he had not made plans to go anyplace but where he went: Moscow. His actions here, including his contacts with Russian officials in Hong Kong, speak louder than his words. Snowden chose, if he had any choice left at all, the Russian option. Just as he believed Chinese intelligence could protect him in Hong Kong from the United States, he could assume that the FSB could protect him in Moscow from the United States. He was not entirely na* ve about its capabilities. During his service in the CIA, he had taken a month-long training course at the CIA’s “farm” at Fort Peary in which counterintelligence officer taught about the capabilities the Russian security services To be sure, he might not have known that Moscow would be his final destination. He may have naively believed that Russia would allow a defector from the NSA who claimed to have had access to the NSA’s sources in Russia and China leave Moscow before its security services obtained that information. But that was not to be. It is not uncommon for a defector to change sides in order to find a better life for himself in another country. Some defectors flee to escape a repressive government or to find one in which they believe they are more closely attuned. But Russia is ordinarily not the country of choice for someone such as Snowden seeking greater civil liberties and personal freedom. So why did Snowden choose Russia for his new life? The four choices that Snowden made in 2013 did not come out of the blue. They all were planned out well in advance. He applied for the job to Booz Allen in February 2013, more than a month before leaving his job at Dell. He applied to Booz Allen for his medical leave, although in fact he had no medical problem, a month before departing for Hong Kong. He brought with him to Hong Kong enough cash to pay his living expenses, according to him, for the next two years. He arranged the encrypted channel with Poitras in February 2013, three months before he would induce her to come to Hong Kong. He made contact with a foreign diplomatic mission at least a month before flying to Moscow and, at some point, met with Russian officials, who arranged a visa-less entry for him. He called Assange in London to arrange for Wikileaks help, 13 days HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020367