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doing so, they not only become subject to the restrictions on Chinese technology users, but they also help
to legitimize China’s vision for “cyber-sovereignty,” an issue that has become an important ongoing global
governance debate. In some cases, they may even be inadvertently advancing China’s goals for military
technological superiority. American technology CEOs, including those from Google, Apple, and Cisco, are
prominent attendees at the World Internet Conference. At one installment of the conference, a Chinese
antiterrorism expert argued that Beijing should increase its pressure on foreign internet companies such
as Twitter, which he argued should be punished for tweets that “defame the party, Chinese leaders, and
related national strategies.” Facebook has been notably solicitous of the Chinese government in an effort
to enter the Chinese market, reportedly developing a tool that could be used by a third party to censor
content. Despite being blocked in China, Facebook nonetheless generates significant advertising revenues
from Chinese companies seeking to reach foreign consumers. As it seeks to reenter the Chinese market,
Google’s willingness to facilitate that country’s national artificial intelligence priorities stand in contrast
to its decision to end limited Al cooperation with the US Department of Defense. In June 2018, Tsinghua
announced that Google’s Al chief would serve as an adviser to that university’s new center for artificial
intelligence research. The company is already involved in research at Peking University and the University
of Science and Technology of China, among others. Artificial intelligence is a declared strategic priority
for the Chinese government with significant military implications. The Chinese government is actively
coordinating the efforts of not just its universities, but also nominally private companies such as Baidu.
Commenting on Google’s Al China Center, at which several hundred engineers are employed, former deputy
defense secretary Bob Work has stated, “anything that’s going on in that center is going to be used” by
the Chinese military. In the summer of 2018, it was reported that Google was considering reentering the
Chinese market with a censored search engine, but Chinese government officials have discounted the
prospect and many of Google’s own employees have expressed opposition.
China also seeks to enlist foreign corporations to reinforce its so-called “core interests” in ways that
have influenced what they feel comfortable saying even outside of China. In early 2018, for example,
foreign companies, particularly in the travel industry, were targeted for listing Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau,
and Tibet as separate entities on their websites rather than as sovereign parts of China. The Civil Aviation
Administration of China sent letters to international airlines demanding that any references to these
destinations except as part of China be removed from their materials and websites. In May, the Trump
administration declared the Chinese government’s order to airlines to be “Orwellian nonsense and part
of a growing trend by the Chinese Communist Party to impose its political views on American citizens
and private companies” with which they might not necessarily agree. At the direction of the American
government, the airlines initially and collectively declined to follow Beijing’s orders, as the US government
considered the issue a diplomatic matter to be resolved between governments. However, when China
declined to negotiate with the US government over the issue, by July the airlines partially met Beijing’s
demands by referring only to cities.
Targeting foreign companies’ speech extends beyond Taiwan to China’s fraught relationship with its
ethnic minorities. At Marriott, an employee responsible for managing the company’s social media accounts
unwittingly liked a tweet by a pro-Tibet group and was fired as a result of the backlash. The company’s
website and app were blocked in China for one week, at unknown financial cost. Daimler, the German
car manufacturer, was similarly forced to apologize for posting a reference to the Dalai Lama, the exiled
Tibetan spiritual leader, on social media. In the latter two cases, the companies were targeted even though
the social services on which they were posting were blocked inside China. See Martina, Michael. “Exclusive:
In China, the Party’s Push for Influence inside Foreign ...” Reuters. August 24, 2017. https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-china-congress-companies/exclusive-in-china-the-partys-push-for-influence-inside
-foreign-firms-stirs-fears-idUSKCN1B40JU; Wong, Chun Han, and Eva Dou. “Foreign Companies in China
Get a New Partner: The Communist Party.” Wall Street Journal. October 29, 2017. https://www.wsj.com
/articles/foreign-companies-in-china-get-a-new-partner-the-communist-party-1509297523; “Command
and Control: China’s Communist Party Extends Reach into Foreign Companies.” Washington Post. Denyer,
Simon. January 28, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/command-and-control
Corporations
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Phone Numbers
Document Details
| Filename | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020577.jpg |
| File Size | 0.0 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 85.0% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 5,122 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-04T16:42:16.351121 |