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165 the business community about the challenge presented by China’s economy and political system and its objectives. NOTES 1 The recent reports by ECFR and Merics/GPPI list some of them, but mainly deal with Europe in general: Francois Godement and Abigael Vasselier, “China at the Gates: A New Power Audit of EU-China Relations,” European Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, http://www.ecfr.eu /publications/summary/china_eu_power_audit7242; and Thorsten Benner, Jan Gaspers, Mareike Ohlberg, Lucrezia Poggetti, and Kristin Shi-Kupfer, “Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe,” MERICS, February 2018. 2 Then foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel on August 30, 2017, ina speech asked China to respect the “One Europe Principle” as much as it demands Europeans respect the “One China Principle.” 3 Achim Sawall, “Duisburg und Huawei Starten die Rhine Cloud,” Golem.de, June 11, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.golem.de/news/du-it-duisburg-und-huawei-starten-die-rhine-cloud-1806 -134892.html. 4 “‘Nihao Deutschland’ Zeigt Deutschen China,” Hamburger Abendblatt, August 8, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.abendblatt.de/kultur-live/tv-und-medien/article211511923/Nihao -Deutschland-zeigt-Deutschen-China.html. 5 Dana Heide, Till Hoppe, Klaus Stratman, and Stephan Scheur, “EU Ambassadors Band Together Against Silk Road,” Handelsblatt, April 17, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018, https://global.handelsblatt.com/politics /eu-ambassadors-beijing-china-silk-road-912258. JAPAN Japan would seem to be the perfect target for the Chinese party-state and its under-the- radar efforts to turn potential adversaries into benign friends. Japan has deep cultural and emotional ties with China, through history, language, and art, and a sense of Asian fraternity forged by their struggles to keep intrusive, overbearing Western powers at bay. Many in Japan also carry an enduring sense of remorse for their country’s brutal subjugation of China in the opening half of the twentieth century. However, the kinds of covert Chinese influence operations that have come to light in countries like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and parts of Europe—with one exception—are not easy to find in Japan. A natural place to look for evidence of influence-peddling would be in Chinese support for the left-wing Japanese peace groups that have long investigated and published evidence of the Imperial Army’s war atrocities in the 1930s and 1940s. Such Japanese research has been politically useful for China in buttressing its own efforts to chronicle the sufferings of its people during the conflict, as well as lending support to Beijing’s tussling with Tokyo over how the history of the war should be managed and told. Appendix 2 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020624