HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg
Extracted Text (OCR)
179
embedded in the intrinsic nature of the Chinese state, they cannot be abandoned unless
the nature of the Chinese state fundamentally changes. This is very unlikely.
NOTES
1 “Singapore Government Statement,” Government of Singapore, May 15, 1971, http://www.nas.gov.sg
/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/SGPress_3_15.5.71.pdf.
2 Jermyn Chow, “SAF Armoured Vehicles Seized in Hong Kong Port, Mindef Expects Shipment to Return
to Singapore ‘Expeditiously,’” Straits Times (Singapore), November 24, 2016, accessed October 11, 2018,
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/9-saf-armoured-vehicles-seized-at-hong-kong-port.
3 “Cancellation of Singapore Permanent Residence (SPR) Status— Huang Jing and Yang Xiuping,”
Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, August 6, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.mha.gov.sg
/newsroom/press-release/news/cancellation-of-singapore-permanent-residence-(spr)-status—huang-jing
-and-yang-xiuping.
4 Shannon Teoh and Eunice Au, “KL Wants Chinese Envoy to Explain Remarks,” Straits Times (Singapore),
October 2, 2015, accessed October 11, 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/kl-wants-chinese
-envoy-to-explain-remarks.
UNITED KINGDOM
Unlike the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the United Kingdom has had
no significant all-encompassing debate over Chinese influence operations. When
they have occurred, the debates tend to be confined to specific areas such as the
media, academia, or the economy. But so far, no one institute has attempted to bring
to light the full gamut of Chinese United Front and influence-peddling operations. As
such, Britain’s response to China’s attempts to insinuate itself within Britain’s critical
infrastructure, universities, civil society, political system, and think tanks has been
scattershot at best.
The United Kingdom has a complex political, economic, and historical relationship
with China, which is a significant trading partner and an increasingly significant
source of investment.' Especially since the official elevation of UK-China relations to
Golden Era status in 2014 and the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the United
Kingdom has become more open to Chinese influence.’ Areas of vulnerability
to improper interference include political and civil society actors as well as the
media. Chinese firms are involved in strategic parts of the British economy, including
telecommunications and nuclear power. Improper interference activities can be difficult
to distinguish from acceptable influence via civil society exchange, public diplomacy,
and commerce. Problem cases include not only Chinese cyberattacks on political
organizations and think tanks but also willing collaboration and reluctant complicity.
A report by GPPi and Merics characterized the most important areas for Chinese
Appendix 2
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638
Extracted Information
Document Details
| Filename | HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020638.jpg |
| File Size | 0.0 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 85.0% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 2,837 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-04T16:42:28.283753 |