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71 Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank Group, and the World Bank Group entered into an agreement under which entities debarred by one MDB will be sanctioned for the same misconduct by other signatory MDBs.*” This cross-debarment agree- ment means that if a company is debarred by one MDB, it is debarred by all?” Loss of Export Privileges Companies and individuals who violate the FCPA may face consequences under other regulatory regimes, such as the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751, et seqg., and its implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.ER. § 120, e¢ seg. AECA and ITAR together provide for the suspension, revocation, amendment, or denial of an arms export license ifan applicant has been indicted or con- victed for violating the FCPA.*” They also set forth certain factors for the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)*” to consider when determining whether to grant, deny, or return without action license applications for certain types of defense materials. One of those factors is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an applicant for a license has violated (or conspired to violate) the FCPA; if so, the Department of State “may disapprove the application.”*” In addition, it is the policy of the Department of State not to consider applications for licenses involving any persons who have been convicted of violating the AECA or convicted of conspiracy to violate the AECA.*” In an action related to the criminal resolu- tion of a UK. military products manufacturer, the DDTC imposed a “policy of denial” for export licenses on three of the company’s subsidiaries that were involved in violations of AECA and ITAR.*” When Is a Compliance Monitor or Independent Consultant Appropriate? One of the primary goals of both criminal prosecu- tions and civil enforcement actions against companies that violate the FCPA is ensuring that such conduct does not occur again. As a consequence, enhanced compliance and reporting requirements may be part of criminal and civil resolutions of FCPA matters. The amount of enhanced compliance and kind of reporting required varies according to the facts and circumstances of individual cases. In criminal cases, a company’s sentence, or a DPA or NPA with a company, may require the appointment of an independent corporate monitor. Whether a monitor is appropriate depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case. In 2008, DOJ issued internal guidance regard- ing the selection and use of corporate monitors in DPAs and NPAs with companies. Additional guidance has since been issued. A monitor is an independent third party who assesses and monitors a company’s adherence to the com- pliance requirements of an agreement that was designed to reduce the risk of recurrence of the company’s misconduct. Appointment of a monitor is not appropriate in all circum- stances, but it may be appropriate, for example, where a com- pany does not already have an effective internal compliance program or needs to establish necessary internal controls. In addition, companies are sometimes allowed to engage in self- monitoring, typically in cases when the company has made a voluntary disclosure, has been fully cooperative, and has demonstrated a genuine commitment to reform. Factors DOJ and SEC Consider When Determining Whether a Compliance Monitor Is Appropriate Include: = Seriousness of the offense = Duration of the misconduct " Pervasiveness of the misconduct, including whether the conduct cuts across geographic and/ or product lines « Nature and size of the company " Quality of the company’s compliance program at the time of the misconduct # Subsequent remediation efforts HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_022573