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that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less,
management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face
higher, not lower, cost of capital.”).
8 For example, in a number of recent enforcement actions, the same
employees who were directing or controlling the bribe payments were
also enriching themselves at the expense of the company. See, e.¢.,
Complaint, SEC vy. Peterson, No. 12-cv-2033 (E.D.NY. 2012), ECF
No. 1, available at http ://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/20 12/
comp-pr2012-78.pdf; Criminal Information, United States v. Peterson,
No. 12-cr-224 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), ECF No. 7 [hereinafter United States v.
Peterson], available at http: //www.justice.gov/' criminal/fraud/ fepa/ cases/
petersong/ petersong-information.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v.
Stanley, No. 08-cr-597 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 9 [hereinafter United
States v. Stanley] , available at http ://www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/
fcpa/ cases/, stanleya/ 09-03-08stanley- plea-agree.pdf; Plea Agreement,
United States v. Sapsizian, No. 06-cr-20797 (S.D. Fla. 2007), ECF No. 42
[hereinafter United States v. Sapsizian|, available at http: //wwwsjustice.
gov/ criminal/fraud/ fcpa/ cases/sapsizianc/' 06-06-07sapsizian- plea.pdf.
? See, 6.8, Complaint, SEC y. Tyco Int'l Ltd., 06-cv-2942 (S.D.N-Y. 2006),
ECF No. 1 [hereinafter SEC v. Tyco Int'l), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/complaints/2006/comp 1 9657.pdf; Complaint, SEC
vy. Willbros Group, Inc. No. 08-cv- 1494 (S.D. Tex. 2008), ECF No. 1
[hereinafter SEC v. Willbros|, available at http ://www.sec.gov/ litigation/
complaints/2008/comp20571 pdf.
10 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Bridgestone Corp., No. 11-cr-
651 (S.D. Tex. 2011), ECF No. 21, available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bridgestone/ 10-05-1 Ibridgestone-plea.pdf.
1 See S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 6; H.R. Rep, 95-640, at 4; see also A. Carl
Kotchian, The Payoff: Lockheed’ 70-Day Mission to Tokyo, SATURDAY
Rev., Jul. 9, 1977, at 7.
US, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM., REPORT OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 2-3 (1976).
3 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 3-4.
“FLR. Rep. No. 95-640, at 4-5; S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 4. The Senate
Report observed, for instance, that “[m]anagements which resort to
corporate bribery and the falsification of records to enhance their
business reveal a lack of confidence about themselves,” while citing the
Secretary of the Treasury's testimony that “| p|aying bribes—apart from
being morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not
necessary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas.” Jd.
'S See S. Rep. No. 100-85, at 46 (1987) (recounting FCPA’s historical
background and explaining that “a strong antibribery statute could help
US. corporations resist corrupt demands... .”) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
100-85].
16S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 7.
17 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988); see also H.R. Rep. No.
100-576, at 916-24 (1988) (discussing FCPA amendments, including
changes to standard of. liability for acts of third parties) [hereinafter H.R.
Rep. No. 100-576].
'8 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 5003(d). The
amended statute included the following directive:
Tt is the sense of the Congress that the President
should pursue the negotiation of an international
agreement, among the members of the Organization
of Economic Cooperation and Development, to
govern persons from those countries concerning
acts prohibited with respect to issuers and domestic
concerns by the amendments made by this section.
Such international agreement should include a
process by which problems and conflicts associated
with such acts could be resolved.
Id.; see also S. Rev. No. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing efforts by
Executive Branch to encourage U.S. trading partners to enact legislation
similar to FCPA following 1988 amendments) [hereinafter S. Rep. No.
105-277].
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions art. 1.1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 LL.M. 1
[hereinafter Anti-Bribery Convention]. The Anti-Bribery Convention
requires member countries to make it a criminal offense “for any person
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, toa foreign
public official, for that official or for a third party, in order that the
official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of
official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business.” The Convention
and its commentaries also call on all parties (a) to ensure that aiding and
abetting and authorization of an act of bribery are criminal offenses, (b)
to assert territorial jurisdiction “broadly so that an extensive physical
connection to the bribery act is not required,” and (c) to assert nationality
jurisdiction consistent with the general principles and conditions of each
party’s legal system. Jd. at art. 1.2, cmts. 25, 26.
20 See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.
L. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998); see also S. Rep. No. 105-277, at 2-3
(describing amendments to “the FCPA to conform it to the requirements
of and to implement the OECD Convention’).
21 There is no private right of action under the FCPA. See, Cs Lamb v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 1990); McLean v.
Int'l Harvester Co., 817 F2d 1214, 1219 (Sth Cir. 1987).
“US. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, US. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-47.110
(2008) [hereinafter USAM ], available at http://wwwjustice.gov/usao/
eousa/: foia_reading_room/ usam/.
23Go to http: //export.gov/ worldwide_us/ index.asp for more
information.
4 Additional information about publicly available market research
and due diligence assistance is available online. See In] Trade Admin.,
Market Research and Due Diligence, available at http ://export.gov/
salesandmarketing/ eg_main_01 8204.as Pp. The International Company
Profile reports include a listing of the potential partner’s key officers
and senior management; banking relationships and other financial
information about the company; and market information, including
sales and profit figures and potential liabilities. They are not, however,
intended to substitute for a company’s own due diligence, and the
Commercial Service does not offer ICP in countries where Dun &
Bradstreet or other private sector vendors are already performing this
service. See In] Trade Admin., International Company Profile, available at
http ://export.gov/, salesandmarketing/ eg_main_018198.asp.
* The Commercial Services’ domestic and foreign offices can also be
found at http://export.gov/usofhices/index.asp and http://export.gov/
worldwide_us/index.as Pp.
26 This form can be located at hetp:/ /tec.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/
index.asp.
* See IN’L TRADE ADMIN., ‘DOING BusINEss IN” GUIDES, available at
http ://export.gov/about/eg_main_0 16806.asp.
8 The Business ErHics MANUAL is available at
http ff www.ita.doc.gov/ goodgovernance/| business_ethics/ manual.asp.
29 Information about the Advocacy Center can be found at hetp:/ /export.
gov/ advocacy.
40 Reports on US. compliance with these treaties can be found at http://
www.justice.gov/ criminal/fraud/ fcpa/ intlagree/ .
3! See Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY Comp. Pres. Doc. 2290, 2291
(Nov. 10, 1998) “U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven
playing field .... The OECD Convention. .. is designed to change all
that. Under the Convention, our major competitors will be obligated to
criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions.’).
» Colombia is also a member of the Working Group and is expected to
accede to the Anti-Bribery Convention.
3 OECD, Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
available at http ://www.oecd.org/document/ 12/0,3746,
en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1 1 _1,00.html.
34 OECD, Phase 3 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, available at http ://www.oecd.org/document/3 1/0,3746,
en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1 1 _1,00.html.
® OECD, Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, available at http ://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3
746,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1 1 1,00.html.
36 The OECD Phase 1, 2, and 3 reports on the United States, as well as
the US. responses to questionnaires, are available at hetp:/ /www.justice.
gov/ criminal/fraud/ fepa/ intlagree.
7 See OECD Working Group on Bribery, United States: Phase 3, Report
on the Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
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