DOJ-OGR-00005399.jpg

Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 Filed 10/29/21 Page6of54 order) (alterations in original) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)); see Fed. R. Evid. 611(b) (imposing limits on the scope of cross-examination). In the context of the disclosure of witness identifying information, the Second Circuit has identified two primary interests of defendants: “(1) obtaining information needed for in-court and out-of-court investigation of the witness; and (2) enabling defense counsel to elicit information that might be relevant to the jury’s deliberations as to the credibility or knowledgeability of the witness.” United States v. Marcus, No. 05 Cr. 457 (ARR), 2007 WL 330388, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2007) (citing United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1266 (2d Cir. 1970)) (finding the defendant’s argument that “the district court’s decision permitting two of the Government’s witnesses to testify using only their first names and not to disclose their addresses or employment violated” the defendant’s due process rights to be “without merit” in a sex trafficking and forced labor case), aff'd, 628 F.3d 36, 45 n.12 (2d Cir. 2010). If the Government provides a reason to “limit disclosure of identifying information in open court,” the defendant must “demonstrate a ‘particularized need’ for disclosure . . . which the court weighs against the risks to the witness.” /d. (citing Marti, 421 F.2d at 1266; United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 901 (2d Cir. 1969)); see United States v. Urena, 8 F. Supp. 3d 568, 572-73 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (permitting an undercover law enforcement officer to testify under a pseudonym, after balancing the relevant interests); cf United States vy. Cavallaro, 553 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1977) (“[W]here the government voices a legitimate concern for a witness’ safety, the trial court must balance the potential danger to the witness against the need of the defense for the information.”’). DOJ-OGR-00005399