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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 _ Filed 10/29/21 Page 24 of 54 undue confusion and an unnecessary sideshow . . .”); United States v. Boyle, No. 08 Cr. 523 (CM), 2009 WL 5178525, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2009) (explaining that the defendant “may offer evidence that Powell killed Hydell. He may not, however, offer evidence concerning that Powell was arrested and prosecuted for the murder.”); United States v. Rodriguez, 582 F. Supp. 2d 486, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (to avoid confusing jurors, defendants precluded from introducing evidence about dismissals of prior charges against them in trial for the same conduct four years later); United States v. Hill, No. 12 Cr. 214 (KAM), 2014 WL 198813, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) (precluding evidence or cross examination of a detective regarding the Kings County District Attorney’s Office decision to question but not charge the defendant for a murder that occurred in 1997 but was only indicted fifteen years later because such testimony is hearsay, irrelevant, and confusing); United States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 484-486 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (precluding the defendant from eliciting basis of decision not to charge a possible co- conspirator); United States v. Carneglia, No. 08 Cr. 76 (JBW), 2009 WL 185725, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2009) (“‘[T]he government’s charging decisions are not proper subjects for cross-examination and argument.’ Evidence related to the government’s charging decisions may be excluded at trial based on lack of relevance.” (quoting United States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 832 (7th Cir. 2005))).® 8 Although there is no per se bar to admission of charging decisions, the Second Circuit has permitted such evidence under narrow circumstances not present here, as discussed in greater detail below. See infra pp. 25-26 (discussing United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 246 (2d Cir. 2012)). 23 DOJ-OGR-00005417