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OUP CORRECTED PROOE - FINAL, 10/9/2014, SPi The Crooked Course Xxxi government. In the following days, I flew to Israel to convey the request to Yossi Beilin, then Deputy Foreign Minister. Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres dispatched the Director General of the ministry, Uri Savir, and the head of the ministry’s legal department, Joel Singer, to Oslo. The Norwegians had, until then, seen the secret talks in Oslo and their potential outcome only as possible inputs to the negotiations in Washington. We were puzzled—and pleasantly surprised—to realize that the parties now wanted to negotiate the full deal under the Oslo framework. Indeed, in the spring of 1993 the parties started to conduct proper negotiations in Oslo—out of the public eye—rather than through the formal process in Washington. Within four months, the Declaration of Principles was initialed in a secret ceremony in the Government Guest House in Oslo. This was followed by a new set of secret negotiations in Paris, facilitated by the Norwegian team (Johan Jorgen Holst, Jan Egeland, Mona Juul, and myself). The outcome was the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which paved the way for the formal signing of the Oslo Accords on the White House lawn on 13 September 1993. The Declaration of Principles was based on the approach that the easiest issues should be resolved first, with remaining issues to be addressed later, step-by-step. A Palestinian Authority for self-rule would be established, first gaining control over Gaza and Jericho, and then gradually expanding into the West Bank. The details of the expansion were to be hammered out in the so-called Oslo II Agreement, signed in Cairo on 28 September 1995. As unique and effective as this approach proved to be, the Oslo Accords would not have been possible without the dramatic changes taking place within the international system at the time. The PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Bank. Simultaneously, the first Intifada between 1987 and 1993 and the emergence of a new local leadership in Gaza and the West Bank created a threat to the leadership of the PLO in exile in Tunis. The organization needed desperately to regain its financial footing, as well as its political stature. These were major incentives to move the Organization into what was to become the Oslo process. The Israeli leadership also had its reasons to come to the negotiating table. The rise of satellite television channels, such as CNN, beamed live images around the world of Israeli soldiers armed to the teeth combating stone-throwing kids in Gaza and the West Bank. Support for the government of Israel dropped dramatically in Europe and at home. Israelis began to feel that they were losing the moral high ground. Israeli leaders saw that using traditional military means to combat the Intifada came at a high political and moral cost. They too were in search of a political way out. In short, the Oslo channel came precisely at the right time, providing a lifeline for both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. The implementation of the Declaration of Principles started in earnest in 1994, with Yasir Arafat’s spectacular arrival in Gaza and the rapid establishment of the Palestinian Authority. I had the pleasure of welcoming him on behalf of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as his newly appointed Special Coordinator for the Occupied HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023163