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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 _ Filed 10/29/21 Page 27 of 54 automobile is deemed to be the possession of all passengers in the automobile unless the firearm is found on the person of a particular passenger. See id. at 245, 247 (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3)). The district attorney dropped the charges against the defendant and three other individuals, leaving only one of the individuals facing state charges for other firearms. See id. at 245. White therefore sought to admit the initial charging decisions at his federal trial, arguing that “if the gun had actually been recovered from his person, none of the other individuals would have been charged with possession of that particular gun.” /d. at 245. The district court rejected that argument, and the Second Circuit reversed, explaining that the “decision to charge all passengers traveling in the vehicle with possession . . . supports White’s theory that none of the firearms was found on his person and discredits the officers’ testimony to the contrary.” Jd. at 247. This case thus contrasts quite sharply with White. In White, the state’s earlier charging decision directly contradicted a consequential fact in the case—whether the defendant was in actual possession of the gun. It was therefore highly relevant as evidence used to undermine the credibility of the officers testifying to the defendant’s possession. Here, however, the Government’s past charging decisions are entirely irrelevant to any factual issue in the case or the credibility of any witness. See Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 485 (distinguishing White in a conspiracy case because “a conspiracy necessarily involves agreement amongst more than one actor to engage in criminal conduct for which all members of the conspiracy may be found equally culpable’). 26 DOJ-OGR-00005420