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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 _ Filed 10/29/21 Page 35 of54 value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the Government and risk of distracting the jury or encouraging jury nullification. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. The Court should therefore preclude evidence or argument regarding the Government’s supposed motives for prosecution, including evidence of Jeffrey Epstein’s 2019 death and the timing of charges against the defendant. The Second Circuit has explained that claims of purported government misconduct must be “directed to the court rather than jury.” United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1082 (2d Cir. 1997). Allegations concerning the government’s conduct are “ultimately separate from the issue of [a defendant’s] factual guilt” and concern an alleged “defect in the institution of the prosecution.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, district courts routinely and correctly preclude defendants from raising these arguments at trial. See id. (“[W]e agree with the district court’s decision to resolve for itself whether the government’s conduct was lawful and to prevent Regan from presenting evidence on that subject.”); United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2004 WL 113506, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004) (granting motion to preclude the defendant from “presenting arguments or evidence that would invite the jury to question the Government’s motives in investigating and indicting” the defendant), aff’d and remanded, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006). This extends to claims challenging the motives of a prosecution. In general, “the decision as to whether to prosecute generally rests within the broad discretion of the prosecutor, and a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision is presumed legitimate.” United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States 34 DOJ-OGR-00005428