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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) On January 18, 2005, Judge Casey issued his decision in Terrorist Attacks I, dismissing claims against, inter alia, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and several Saudi Princes on sovereign immunity and personal jurisdiction grounds. Judge Casey held that the FSIA protected the Princes from claims arising from actions undertaken in their official capacities. SPA25. The decision also dismissed claims against Al Rajhi Bank in the Burnett action for failure to state a claim, a ruling that was then extended to the remaining MDL cases by Order dated May 5, 2005. SPA57, 2548-51. On September 21, 2005, Judge Casey issued a second opinion, Terrorist Attacks IT, dismissing claims in certain of the MDL cases against two additional Saudi Princes, again on FSIA and personal jurisdiction grounds, as well as claims against the Saudi High Commission for Relief of *13 Bosnia & Herzegovina (SHC), a purported charity operating as an alter-ego of the Saudi government, also under the FSIA. SPA76-77, 81, 98. On December 16, 2005, the district court certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) its orders of January 18, 2005, May 5, 2005, and September 21, 2005 with respect to the Kingdom, Princes, SHC, and several other defendants, but not as to Al Rajhi Bank. Docket # 1554. Plaintiffs filed appeals as to the dismissals of the Kingdom, five Princes and SHC, and a panel of this Court issued a decision concerning those appeals on August 14, 2008. Terrorist Attacks HT, 538 F.3d 71. Affirming the dismissals of the Kingdom and SHC, the Panel held that tort claims against foreign states for injuries resulting from a terrorist attack on U.S. soil may not be brought under the FSIA’s non-commercial torts exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(5), but must instead be brought exclusively under the FSIA’s so-called State Sponsor of Terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. §1605A. Jd. at 80-86. Because Saudi Arabia is not a designated State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Panel deemed the Kingdom and SHC immune from the September 11th plaintiffs’ tort claims. Jd. In also affirming dismissals of four of the Princes for conduct undertaken in their official capacities, the Panel ruled that individual foreign officials are entitled to *14 the protections of the FSIA. /d. at 90-92. Finally, the Panel affirmed the dismissals of all five Princes for claims arising from their personal, nongovernmental activities, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them for the claims as pled would not comport with due process. Id. at 93-95. Plaintiffs thereafter sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court of each of these three principal holdings. In response to a request from the Supreme Court, the United States filed an amicus brief on May 29, 2009, expressing its views that this Court’s reasoning was flawed with respect to each of the holdings. Br. for the United States, Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2009 WL 1539068 (2009). With regard to the decision’s due process analysis, the United States stated “[i]t is unclear precisely what legal standard the court of appeals applied in affirming the district court’s holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Princes for their personal actions .... To the extent the court of appeals’ language suggests that a defendant must specifically intend to cause injury to residents in the forum before a court there may exercise jurisdiction over him, that is incorrect. It is sufficient that the defendant took ‘intentional * * * tortious, actions’ and ‘knew that the brunt of thle] injury would be felt’ in the *15 foreign forum.” Jd. at *19, (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-790 (1984)). Even so, the United States argued that the questions presented by the Petition did not warrant review by the Court. Jd. at *22. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Federal Ins. Co. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 129 8. Ct. 2859 (2009). A few months later, the Supreme Court accepted review of another case raising the applicability of the FSIA to claims against individual foreign officials and unanimously held that the FSIA does not apply to individual officials of foreign states. Samantar v. Yousuf, et al., 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). This Court subsequently acknowledged that Samantar “abrogated [Terrorist Attacks IT insofar as it held FSIA applied to individual officials.” Carpenter v. Republic of Chile, 610 F.3d 776 (2d Cir. 2010). Throughout the course of the prior appeals to this Court and related proceedings before the Supreme Court, approximately 90 initial Rule 12 motions remained pending before the district court. Following Terrorist Attacks IIT, the district court directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs concerning the import of that decision to the remaining motions to *16 dismiss, as well as lists identifying those defendants’ motions as to which the holdings in Terrorist Attacks II were dispositive. In their submissions, plaintiffs conceded that Terrorist Attacks ITI was dispositive as to the immunity defenses asserted by the Saudi Red Crescent Society (SRC) and Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), two purported charity alter-egos of the Kingdom. As Terrorist Attacks III purported to resolve the entitlement of only senior foreign officials to FSIA immunity, plaintiffs asserted that the import of that holding as to the immunity defenses asserted by several WESTLAW HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023374