HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023375.jpg

In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) remaining defendants, who allegedly held more junior positions in foreign governments, was unclear. Struggling to interpret the precise meaning of Terrorist Attacks III's personal jurisdiction holding, plaintiffs submitted that the decision could be interpreted as drawing a distinction between direct and indirect support of terrorism for due process purposes, and that Terrorist Attacks [II should not be read to allow defendants with direct ties to al-Qaeda to evade jurisdiction. Plaintiffs expressly reserved their right to argue on appeal that, among other things, a rule immunizing indirect sponsors of terrorism from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts for injuries *17 suffered in the United States on due process grounds is incorrect and inconsistent with controlling precedent. For their part, the defendants asserted that Terrorist Attacks [IT should be read to require, for purposes of due process, a showing that the defendant “intentionally provided funding to support the September 11 attacks against the United States.” R.2140, 1-2, 13. On February 4, 2009, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority bringing to the district court’s attention the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2008 (en banc) (Boim ITD). R. 2156. In its decision, the Seventh Circuit comprehensively discussed the substantive liability standards governing civil claims under the ATA, and the findings and policies that prompted the Legislative and Executive Branches to establish a civil cause of action for the benefit of terror victims against material sponsors and supporters of terrorism. The Boim HT court held that liability under the ATA extends to any person who knowingly or recklessly provided material support or resources to the terrorist organization responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries, whether directly or indirectly, and that a plaintiff in an ATA case need not allege any specific or temporal link *18 between the defendant’s support and the attack producing the plaintiffs injury. Jd. at 688-702. On June 17, 2010, Judge Daniels issued an opinion, Terrorist Attacks IV, resolving the motions to dismiss of thirty-seven defendants, and holding that thirty-six of those defendants were entitled to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. SPA152-211. The defendants dismissed through that decision included Appellees Abdullah bin Laden, Bakr bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, Tariq bin Laden, Yeslam bin Laden, Dallah Avco Trans-Arabia Co. Ltd. (Dallah Avco), DMI Administrative Services, Faisal Islamic Bank, Saleh al Hussayen, Yousef Jameel, Abdulrahman bin Mahfouz, Khaled bin Mahfouz, National Commercial Bank (NCB), Abdullah al Obeid (Obeid), Abdullah al Rajhi, Saleh al Rajhi, Suleiman al Rajhi, Schreiber & Zindel Treuhand Anstalt, Frank Zindel, Engelbert Schreiber, Sr., Engelbert Schreiber, Jr., Al Shamal Islamic Bank (Shamal), Abdul Rahman al Swailem (Swailem), Tadamon Islamic Bank (Tadamon), Abdullah Muhsen al Turki (Turki), Martin Wachter, Erwin Wachter, Sercor Treuhand Anstalt, and Asat Trust (Asat). Generally, the district court predicated the dismissals of those Appellees on its conclusions that: (1) a defendant’s indirect funding of al- *19 Qaeda through a charitable intermediary “is, under controlling Second Circuit law, of no jurisdictional import,” see SPA196; or (2) plaintiffs were required, but failed, to present allegations and facts sufficient to demonstrate the defendant’s “specific intent that [his support for al-Qaeda] be used to aid al-Qaeda in the commission of a terrorist attack against the United States, see SPA197. In certain cases, the district court went further, appearing to require allegations or facts (or even evidence) directly linking the defendant to the September 11th Attacks. See SPA194. On September 13, 2010, Judge Daniels issued another decision concerning the motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction of an additional seven defendants, and thirty-three defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. SPA214-253 (Terrorist Attacks V, 740 F. Supp. 2d 494). The district court granted the motions of all seven defendants seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, thereby dismissing Appellees Abdullah Naseef (Naseef), Sulaiman al-Ali (Al), Adnan Basha (Basha), Jamal Khalifa (Khalifa), Aqeel Al-Aqeel (Aqeel), Yassin al Kadi (al Kadi), and Soliman al-Buthe (al-Buthe). SPA217-227. The reasoning in support of those dismissals generally followed that offered by the district court relative to the dismissals in Terrorist Attacks *20 TV. As a component of its rulings dismissing two of the defendants-Appellees, the district court specifically held that a defendant’s “terrorist designation” by the U.S. government for sponsoring al-Qaeda is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, Terrorist Attacks V, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 508, and that a defendant’s status as “a key al Qeda operative” and direct participation in several al-Qaeda plots and attacks other than 9/11 was insufficient to establish jurisdiction absent an allegation that he “played any role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks” or “had authority to steward the direction of al-Qaeda’s terrorist operation.” SPA223. Terrorist Attacks Valso granted motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under the Anti-Terrorism Act, of Appellees Dar al-Maal-al Islami Trust (DMI Trust), Saleh Abdullah Kamel (Kamel), and al Baraka Investment and Development Corp (al Baraka). The dismissal was primarily based on the conclusion that plaintiffs did not adequately allege that those defendants knew, or recklessly disregarded, that WESTLAW HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023375