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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” /d. at § 2331(1). Such acts “transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished ....” Jd. Defendants’ alleged provision of material support to al-Qaeda and entities assisting its efforts readily falls within the ATA’s scope. The district court did not dispute that plaintiffs adequately alleged that they were injured by acts of international terrorism. See SPA214 (Terrorist Attacks V); SPA1, 52 n.39 (Terrorist Attacks I). Those injuries arose from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which were attacks using means *68 that transcend borders and that were intended to intimidate a civilian population and to affect the conduct of the United States Government. Thus, plaintiffs allege that defendants are both primarily and secondarily liable under the ATA, and the district court analyzed the claims under both theories. Compare SPA237 (Terrorist Attacks V) (finding that plaintiffs allege claims of primary liability under the ATA), with SPA52-53 (Terrorist Attacks I) (analyzing plaintiffs’ claims as alleging theories of secondary liability under the ATA). Primary liability is implicated because the plaintiffs’ injuries arose from violations of federal criminal laws that proscribe material support of terrorists, including through financing and through furthering the transborder attack of Americans within the United States. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, 2339C, 2332B. Courts have recognized primary liability under the ATA for providing financing to terrorist organizations, even when the financing is channeled indirectly through intermediaries. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. (Boim III), 549 F.3d 685, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that “donors to terrorism [cannot] escape liability because terrorists and their supporters launder donations through a chain of intermediate organizations”); see also *69 Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 50-54 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding liability based on support provided to an agent of a terrorist organization). In addition, the organization receiving the support need only have a connection to terrorism. Cf’ Humanitarian Law Project, 130 8. Ct. at 2717 (“Congress plainly spoke to the necessary mental state for a violation of § 2339B, and it chose knowledge about the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to further the organization’s terrorist activities”) (emphasis added); Boim ITT, 549 F.3d at 702 (finding that Donor A cannot escape ATA liability by providing funds “to innocent-appearing organization B which gives to innocent-appearing organization C which gives to [a terrorist organization]’”). Secondary liability under the ATA is present where defendants aid and abet those undertaking the terrorist act harming Americans. See, e.g., Boim I, 291 F.3d at 1010; Wyatt, 785 F. Supp. 2d at 645, 649; Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 54-57; Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 571, 582-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). In this case, plaintiffs allege that the defendants are secondarily liable under the ATA because their financing and other support activities aided and abetted al-Qaeda in terrorism. *70 Under both theories of liability, an ATA claim may be predicated on the provision of support without plaintiffs having to establish that the defendants sought to advance any particular terrorist attack -- or even terrorist activities generally -- by the entities or persons receiving that support. See, e.g., Boim HI, 549 F.3d at 692-95 (finding that a donor need only know the character of the terrorist organization to be liable under the ATA); Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 40-41; Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (“The requirement that the defendant have specifically intended to further terrorist activities finds no basis in the statute’s language”); Humanitarian Law Project, 130 8S. Ct. at 2729 (money provided to a terrorist group for purportedly legitimate activities can be “redirected to funding the group’s violent activities”). Here, with an exception applicable to discrete allegations regarding two defendants,'” the district court acknowledged that plaintiffs, if they could establish that defendants acted with the requisite mental state,'!° adequately pled an ATA claim. See supra pp. 65-66 nn. 104-108. The district court also recognized that the ATA provides for recovery even if *71 the defendants did not anticipate or intend the September 11th Attacks, because it was well known during the 1990s that al-Qaeda sought to commit terrorist acts against the United States. SPA237-38 (Terrorist Attacks V); SPA20, 50 (Terrorist Attacks I). Thus, merely providing material support to al-Qaeda or a related entity with the requisite state of mind would suffice to make the defendants liable for injuries caused by al-Qaeda’s acts of international terrorism. See SPA237-39 (Terrorist Attacks V); SPA112-114 (SAMBA ID; SPA110 (DMI-Kamel). This accords with the reasoning of other courts that have addressed ATA claims. See, e.g., Boim IIT, 549 F.3d at 693-94; Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 50-53; Weiss, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 627 n.15. In sum, under a theory of secondary liability, the attacks are attributed to defendants based on their support for al-Qaeda and its affiliated entities and efforts to advance its objectives. Under a theory of primary liability, the defendants’ provision of support to al-Qaeda and its affiliated entities makes them directly responsible for the resulting, entirely foreseeable terrorist WESTLAW HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023386