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In re: TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001., 2012 WL 257568 (2012) Thus, even in that more rigorous context, the D.C. Circuit has squarely rejected the approach taken by the district court here (ignoring the context of a defendant’s alleged actions and examining each allegation in isolation). For example, the habeas cases repeatedly find that an inference of al-Qaeda membership may be drawn from a pattern of dealing with persons associated with al-Qaeda or from sharing characteristics with those persons. See Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407 (circumstantial evidence, in the form of repeated dealings with al-Qaeda, sufficient to establish membership) *112 (collecting cases). As the D.C. Circuit held, such “evidence tend[s] to show [the detainee’s] close relationship with these men and thus strengthen[s] the probability that he was part of al-Qaida.” Al Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1109; accord Uthman, 637 F.3d at 407 (“[detainee’s] actions and recurrent entanglement with al Qaeda show that he more likely than not was part of al Qaeda”). Just as clearly, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that courts “must view the evidence collectively rather than in isolation.” Salahi, 625 F.3d at 753. “Merely because a particular piece of evidence is insufficient, standing alone, to prove a particular point does not mean that the evidence ‘may be tossed aside and the next [piece of evidence] may be evaluated as if the first did not exist.’ ” Jd. (quoting Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d at 1105) (brackets in original). 4. The District Court Vailed to Accept the Truth of the Tacts Alleged. In considering a motion to dismiss, courts are of course under an obligation to “assume the[] veracity” of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations and to view them “in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Matson, 631 F.3d at 72. In addressing crucial allegations bearing directly on defendants’ state of mind, the district court failed to follow these basic principles. *113 For example, when analyzing the claims against Al Rajhi Bank, the district court rejected the truth of plaintiffs’ allegations, and instead, accepted Al Rajhi Bank’s version of events. After recounting plaintiffs’ allegation that Al Rajhi Bank had a duty to inquire into the recipients of their zakat donations, the district court noted that Al Rajhi Bank “submits it did not have a duty, or a right, to inspect the ... charities’ financial transactions to ascertain the ultimate destination of its donations.” SPAS6 (Terrorist Attacks I). The district court continued, “Al Rajhi Bank contends it had a legal and religious duty to make its charitable donations and any terrorist activity by the recipient charities was unknown to Al Rajhi Bank.” Jd. The district court then concluded that the “[p]laintiffs do not offer facts to support their conclusions that Al Rajhi Bank had to know that ... [the recipient] charities ... were supporting terrorism.” Jd. at 57. To reach this finding, the district court necessarily ignored or declined to assume the truth of plaintiffs’ express allegation that Al Rajhi Bank was “required to determine that the ultimate recipients of these contributions fall within one of the categories prescribed in the Quran for recipients of Zakat.” Jd. At the pleading stage, the court’s reasoning is error. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Matson, 631 F.3d at 72. *114 The district court also failed to follow the standards that govern review of a motion to dismiss when it rejected “as having no evidentiary value” the plaintiffs’ allegations that Saleh Abdullah Kamel and Al Rajhi Bank’s chairman and managing director, Suleiman Abdel Aziz al Rajhi, were listed on the Golden Chain. SPA247 (Terrorist Attacks V); accord SPA110 (DMI-Kamel); SPA42 (Terrorist Attacks 1). This finding is not only an impermissible rejection of plaintiffs’ allegations concerning the Golden Chain, but also is inconsistent with the findings of other courts and the Executive branch. For example, the Golden Chain -- along with other documents discovered in the same raid -- was relied upon by the Government in an Evidentiary Proffer of al-Qaeda sponsor, Enaam Arnaout, and also referenced and used as a resource in Arnaout’s sentencing hearing. See supra pp. 54-55 nn.85-86. It was cited in the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report in July 2004, see supra pp. 25-26 & n.8, and the CRS has cited it in numerous reports, see supra p. 56. The 9/11 Commission Monograph on Terrorism Financing cites to “a group of wealthy donors from the Persian Gulf region known as the “Golden Chain,” which provided support to ... Usama Bin Ladin.” See supra p. 55 & n.87. The 9/11 Monograph continues: *115 The material seized [in Bosnia] included many documents never before seen by U.S. officials, such as the actual minutes of al Qaeda meetings, the al Qaeda oath, al Qaeda organizational charges, and the “Golden Chain” list of wealthy donors to the Afghan mujahideen .... WESTLAW HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023397