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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 380 _ Filed 10/29/21 Page 49 of 54 power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.” (emphasis in original)). Even if a defendant offers character evidence, that evidence may not include specific instances of good conduct, unless the defendant’s character is an “essential element” of the offense. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) & 405; see, e.g., United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 792 & n.77 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Nachamie, 28 F. App’x 13, 20-21 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order). Character evidence is only admissible “by testimony about the person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.” Fed. R. Evid. 405(a); see, e.g., United States v. Riley, 638 F. App’x 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“The limitations imposed by the district court followed directly from the Rules of Evidence, which permit a defendant to offer evidence of a personal opinion or his reputation for a pertinent character trait, but not to offer testimony regarding ‘specific instances’ of conduct in conformity with a trait that is not at issue.” (citations omitted)). The Government is unaware of any relevant reason for the jury to consider the defendant’s charitable activities, family history, or similar facts. Because those facts have nothing to do with her guilt or innocence, and they are not permissible character evidence, she should be precluded from mentioning such subjects in her opening statement, during the presentation of evidence, or in closing statements, absent a ruling that a specific fact is relevant and more probative than unfairly prejudicial. 48 DOJ-OGR-00005442