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South China Morning Post Monday, November 21,2016 All INSIGHT Core strength Robert Lawrence Kuhn says those who see China’s designation of Xi Jinping as core leader to be a vari tion of strongman rule misunderstand its significance for a people navigating their way through huge challenges hen, at a recent party plenum, President Xi Jin- ping (#2) was designated as “core” of the Communist Party's Central Committee, some Western media were quick to condemn the rise of a new “strongman”. While recognising the significance of Xi as the core was correct, conjuring up visions of an emerging dictator was not. T recalled my meeting with Xi years earlier, when he wasstill party secretary of Zhejiang ("f71) prov- ince. Even then he was criticising “empty talk” and advising, “We should never overestimate our accomplishments or indulge our- selves in our achievements”. I took note of how Xi stressed, “We need to assess ourselves objec- tively”. Hardly, in retrospect, the ruminations ofa gestating dictator. To understand why Xiis nowthe core, one must appreciate the complex challenges of our times. China is now facing multiple chal- lenges: domestically-slow growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, imbalanced develop- ment, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; and, internationally—wars, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, vola- tile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopoliti- cal rivalries, and territorial disputes in the South and East China seas. Most critically, because China must deepen its reforms to achieve its oft-promised goal of a “moder- ately prosperous society” by 2020, the resistance of entrenched inter- est groups must be overcome. More there is what some call a pervasive “soft resistance” - local officials who do not do their job and economic elites who migrate. Ifreform had been progressing smoothly, then why strengthen central authority by investing Xi with the status of core leader? Xihas encountered obstacles; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need foracore leader. Thave been speaking to party officials and theorists about Xi as core leader. In fact, the necessity of having a leadership core to main- tain stability and expedite reform is the first and foremost of what I found to be four factors relating to Xi's elevation. Asecond factor is that not only does Xi have the responsibility for China’s transformation, he is also accountable forit. Moreover, hehas shown courage in confronting and dismantling a vast, corrupt system of bribery, patronage and illicit wealth accretion. Athird factoris thatXias the core does not end, and even may not di- minish, the cardinal principle of Xi Jinping as core leader is more a ratification of reality than ashift of fundamentals § re pee “democratic centralism”. The party bolsters each of the concepts: encouraging the democratic sclici- tation of input and feedback from members, lower-ranked officials, and the public; and strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadershi) of the principal levers of power (his positions as party general secretary, head of state, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and head of the “leading groups” on reform, national security and inter- net security) A fourth factor is that a core is required to manage the party more strictly and thereby give members and the public more confidence. Witness Xi’s relentless and unprec- edented anti-corruption campaign, which is altering how government officials and industry managers work and even think. Let no one assume that Xi’s battle against corruption has been risk-free. Significantly, these four factors undergirding Xi as the core leader map onto his overarching political framework, his strategic blueprint called “The Four Comprehensives” —a moderately prosperous society, reform, rule of law, party discipline. Xi’s core status arises, we're told, through the collective will of the party and the people. Becoming party core is not an automatic consequence of being general sec- retary; a core leader must fit the times and the status must be earned. Speaking at a press conference following the 18th Central Commit- tee's sixth plenum last month, Huang Kunming (#!#), executive vice-minister of the committee's Publicity Department, said that the “central and local departments as well as the military all expressed their support” for Xi’s position as party core, adding that this decision was “based on the valuable experi- ence of the party and we feel keenly aboutit”. Huang explained that “a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party”, describing it as significant for upholding the Central Committee’s authority and maintaining the central, unified leadership of the party and for its “staying true to its mission”. Therefore, party theorists explain, Xi as core leader is more a ratification of reality than a shift of fundamentals. What does Xi as core mean ina historical context? It was Deng Xiaoping (9!) who introduced the concept when he designated Jiang Zemin (1) as “core of the third generation” of central leaders, bolstering Jiang’s stature following his unexpected appointment as party leader in 1989. At the time, China was facing the dual impedi- ments of economic stagnation and social uncertainty at home, and economic quarantine and diplo- matic isolation abroad. As Deng pointed out: “Any leading group should have a core; a leadership with no core is unreliable.” Only then did Deng retrospec- tively apply the novel term to Mao Zedong (€:840) and to himself, as core of the first and second gener- ations, respectively. (Of course, Mao was so utterly dominant that calling him core during his lifetime would have seemed a demotion. Deng remained core even when he no longerheld any official position.) Today's world is more complex. China faces threats at home and abroad. Volatility grows and uncer- tainty abounds ~ the Middle East and Donald Trump are offered as evidence. The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever, and thus to strengthen Xi’s authority is a primary reason, I'm told, for designating Xi as core leader. Party theorists say China “urgently” requires a political nucl- eus that is sophisticated and nuanced, attuned to contemporary times. Though conditions now differ from those in 1989, Deng’s admonition rings timelessly true. However, that a core leader is needed now does notmean onewill always be needed. When China becomesa fully modernised nation, perhaps by mid-century, condi- tions may change again. True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests Thear frequently of the “painful lessons of China's century of blood and tears” and that for China not to have a tested and authoritative leadership core would be “unthink- able”. Party inner talk says “Xi Jinping has passed the test of the people” to be China's political core, leadership core, and a core of the times. Chinese scholars argue that “core” is a unique characteristic of Chinese political theory — however inapplicable (even inexplicable) in Western political theory. They call Western concerns that Xi as core leader means that “a new emperor is born” wildly unfounded, even paranoic. In feudal society, the emperor ruled unconditionally with arbitrary imperial power, and insucha“command-obey’ system, goes the argument, there is simply noneed for acore. Rather, given today’s party polit- ical structure, the concept ofa core both strengthens cohesion and serves to prevent a personality cult, not to promote one. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the “emperor system" —absolute poweris rejected —and that the optimum system, at least for the foreseeable future, is a combination of concentrated cen- tralism and democratic collective leadership. Corroborating this functional balance, in the communiquéissued following the sixth plenum, the “collective leadership system” is reconfirmed. It states: “The imple- mentation of collective leadership and personal division oflabouris an important component of demo- cratic centralism and must always beadhered to.” And itstresses: “Any organisation or individual shall, under any circumstance, not be allowed to violate this system for anyreason.” Thethree “any’s” seem no accident. Some analysts see contradic- tions. On the one hand, the communiqué calls for democracy and constructive criticism internal- ly within the party. On the other, disobeying the central leadership is forbidden, backed by vigilant supervision and tough discipline. Yet to read these statements as contradictory is to misunderstand what is happening here. Xi appreci- ates the complex and arduous tasks that lie ahead. He told me so a decade ago, and itis obviously truer today than it was then. The state- ments are harmonised, first, by the party's motivation toseek optimum peices forthe country, and second, yy keeping most of the divergent views internal. True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their bestinterests, not pandering and fawning by repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear. Though there are concerns, no one here worries that Xi will become Mao. China is now the world’s largest trading nation and its second-larg- est economy. China's diplomacy is expanding and its military is grow- ing. Fromits Belt and Road initiative building infrastructure and facili- tating trade in over 60 developing countries to its leading role in the UN peacekeeping forces, China, the “Middle Kingdom’, is involved in every meaningful matter of interna- tional affairs. So, what kind of China do we want? Certainly not one with weak central leadership and fragmented citadels of power. With its huge and imbalanced population, and its diverse culture and traditions, China today requires a leader with sufficient strength and prestige to secure social stability, drive eco- nomic reform, and guide it in being a responsible world power. Xi as core leader should be good for China and, thus, for the world. Robert Lawrence Kuhnisa public intellectual, political/economics commentator, and an international corporate strategist. He spoke at the launch ceremony of President Xi Jinping's book, The Governance of China, and is the host of Closer to China with R. L. Kuhn, a weekly show on CCTV News produced by Adam Zhu Bring down the curtain on this idiotic political drama feel you. It’s draining, to say the least, especially when the melodrama in Hong Kong is dragging out; it has become downright dreadful when we know there is no respite in sight. We were supposed to havea brief break after last September's Legislative Council polls, before the next big event. Even though a large number of people will be unable to casta vote in the Election Committee subsector elections, less than a month away, and in the chief executive election, scheduled for late March next year, the city should by now be focusing on what's ahead. But, thanks to the two recently disqualified lawmakers, who lacked. the necessary knowledge, ability and respect for oath-taking, our (albeit dytunctcnal) legislature has basically been shut down fora month. The ugly politics that should have been insulated within [ase ofall the politics, 1 Alice Wu has had enough of the brouhaha over the oath-taking by two lawmakers. Now that they’ve been disqualified, HK must focus on battles ahead the chamber once again spilled out onto our streets. And what should have been decided and concluded on September4 isnow dragging on indefinitely, with two or possibly more by-elections added to the election overload. Hell-raising politics is not going away any time soon, but the sheer stupidity of the localist pair's actions really is one for the books— Macbeth, in fact: Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow, / Creeps in this pet e from day today, ” pape To the last syllable of recorded time, /And all our yesterdays have lighted fools The way to dusty death. Out, out, briefcandle!/ Life's buta walking shadow, a poor player Thatsthutsdnd pets ‘his hour upon the stage/And then is heard no more. Itisa tale Told by an idiot, fullofsound and fury, / Signifying nothing. hey wet eee hlloound and fury, and they did nothing for thecommon good. What they did opened the door for an invitation to the courts to intervene. What they did presented an opportunity foran interpretation of the Basic Law by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. What they did, oltenatey may well become the precedent {for other legislators to be similarly barred. And that is why the duo's pledge to spend every penny—and lest we forget, this also means the mounting cost to the public purse— to “appeal atall costs” isbeyond rich, coming from them. Clearly, they have yet to wrap their heads around the concept of “personal responsibility”. Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang is wrong in believing that their disqualification from Legco rendered the election meaningless. They have no one but themselves to blame for their defenestration. It istheywho made the election meaningless. And, to add insult to the grave injury they brought on the rest of us, they are asking for donations. At some point—ifwe're not there already—we must take serious offence to be taken as fools, again and again. The curtain must now be drawn on this overly played-out second act. The irony may be lost on the pat butit's pretty obvious who has een played for total fools. In case theyhaven’tnoticed, the lawmakers who served as the duo's chaperones have stopped babysitting them because there is no value in being their keepers any more. Escorting the duo's Legco gate-crashing attempts served their purpose: to usher the two straight to their political end, and the votes the two rendered meaningless are now political spoils. The two took the toxic brew and there will be no stay of execution that could stop those ready to contest their seats. Wemustfight our political fatigue. We can ill afford to be distracted by those who continuously try to foolishly make their own stupid mistakes our collective problem. Alice Wu isa political consultant and aformer associate director of the Asia Pacific Media Network at UCLA > CONTACT US: Agree or disagree with the opinions on this page? Write to us at letters@scmp.com. If you have an idea for an opinion article, email itto oped@scmp.com The basic law of unintended consequences Mike Rowse says the continuing political tussles in HK illustrate the pain of being caught in a cycle of actions and reactions, and we must address the root cause of the grievances the Basic Lawand the rule of law, and their interaction. Perhaps neglected in the process has been a different but relevant concept: the law of unintended consequences, whereby an action gives rise to outcomes unforeseen by the instigator. Hong Kong's tortuous path towards political reform isacase in point. The first reference to the idea of universal suffrage for selection of the chief executive comes in Article 45 of the Basic Law, promulgated back in 1990. Looking towards 1997, its purpose was to reassure. Naturally, attention turned to the subject in the early part of this century. While people understood. that the move towards universal suffrage had to be in accordance with the “principle of gradual and orderly progress”, the reform package put forward in 2014 was widely perceived as disappointing; the plan to stick with an unrepresentative nominating committee deciding who could enter the race was unpalatable. The State Council's white paper on the governance of Hong Kong, intended to set things straight, only stirred things up and led to the Occupy Central protests. The governmentlet the action linger, hoping public anger would pay dividends in the 2016 Legislative Council election. While the 79 days of disruption did bring the protesters momentary opprobrium, memories quickly faded. In the election, the pro-government share of the vote actually fell, and the attack on the idea of independence led directly toa near 20 percent share of the vote for a localist faction. This was surely not the objective. Now the government is trying to overturn the election outcome. The practice of banning some potential candidates from standing, then using all meansat hand to unseat some of those elected, is a tactic more usually associated with third-world countries following a military coup. Has something been lost in translation here? Perhaps we need an interpretation of the interpretation In the short term, the judicial review sought by the chief executive against the decision by Legco president Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen to give Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching another opportunity to take the oath has been successful. Mr Justice ‘Thomas Au Hing-cheung ruled in the High Court that their oaths were invalid, they should notbe given a second chance and their positions should immediately be vacated, Many observers thought he might decline toruleatall, and simply refer the matter back to the Legco president. The problem with one arm of the administration delving too deeply into the processes of anotheris that it inevitably generates more requests to doso. And, sure enough, we now have legal challenges against more legislators, plus a challenge against the chief executive himself. Given that, in the past, other Legco members who had politicised their swearing-in and then done it properly second time round were permitted to take up their seats, did Leung and Yau havea “legitimate expectation” that they would enjoy similar treatment? The Legco president certainly thought so, hence his origin: ruling Nowitis for: ahigher court to decide. Meanwhile, the National People's Congress Standing Committee has sought to clarify Article 104 of the Basic Law, which requires all people concemed to “swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China and swear allegiance” to it. But the interpretation is different: it talks of “a legal pledge ... to the People’s Republic of China and its Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region” (emphasis added). Has something been lost in translation here? Perhaps we need an interpretation of the interpretation. If, at the end of the day, there are two (ormore) vacant Legco seats, then we are in by-election territory. Idon’t think the people are fooled for one minute about whatis going on. In each constituen impeccable opposition candidate will stand, wina majority, and take the oath impeccably. Unfortunately, this tragedy - or farce —will continue until the government starts to address the underlying grievances over the lack of meaningful political reform instead of just hammering the symptoms, which generates new grievances in the process. r | here has been a considerable focus recently on Mike Rowse is the CEO of Treloar Enterprises and an adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. mike@rowse.com.hk Ayellow umbrella, a symbol of the Occupy movement, is used ina recent protest against Beijing. Photo: Reuters HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023688

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Indexed 2026-02-04T16:52:03.946584