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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 383 _ Filed 10/29/21 Page 37 of 40 offenses are negated by a consent defense. (See Gov’t Mot. at 39-40). Accordingly, there is no basis to offer evidence or make argument related to the Minor Victims’ consent. In Counts Two and Four, the defendant is charged under the Mann Act with transporting a minor with intent to violate New York Penal Law § 130.55, and enticing a minor to do the same. That crime does not relate to prostitution. In Counts One and Three, the defendant is charged with conspiracy to violate the same statute—not “varying local state laws” in “multi-jurisdictional locations,” (Def. Opp. at 47), and not violating the Mann Act with intent to commit prostitution. In Count Six, the defendant is charged with sex trafficking of a person less than eighteen. In Count Five, the defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit the same. Because these offenses all involve crimes with victims below specified age cutoffs for which consent is not a defense, consent is not at issue in this case. The defense is therefore wrong when it argues that the Government has “charged offenses associated with coercion, force and violence.” (/d. at 49). The charges in the Indictment concern sexual activity with a minor, simpliciter. The Government has not, for instance, charged sex trafficking through force, fraud, or coercion, and those elements are not at issue in this case. This misunderstanding by the defense underlies its response to this point. For instance, the defense suggests that Minor Victim-4 was engaged in prostitution at the time of the charged offenses, which might give her criminal exposure under Florida law. (See id. at 48). That is irrelevant, because all that matters for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1591—and therefore this case— is that she was a minor. See, e.g., United States v. Corley, 679 F. App’x 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (“Further, the victims could not consent because they were minors.”). 36 DOJ-OGR-00005591