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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 393 Filed 10/29/21 Page /7of10 e Any testimony about the nature and structure of alleged conspiracies, or the nature and structure of alleged sex trafficking operations. See United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1988) (testimony about the nature and structure of organized crime is expert opinion testimony); see also Mejia, 545 F.3d at 189-92. e Any testimony purporting to interpret the communications of others or “codes.” See United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1987) (testimony about the meaning of messages written in code is expert opinion testimony); United States v. Borrone-Iglar, 468 F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1972) (testimony “concerning the narcotics vernacular used in [recorded] telephone conversations” is expert opinion testimony). e Any testimony vouching for or bolstering the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1992) (improper for an expert to bolster government fact-witness’ credibility because such bolstering is irrelevant and prejudicial). e Any “opinion about whether [Ms. Maxwell] did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b); see United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 196 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Testimony regarding whether the defendant ‘realized’ that there were drugs in the car was erroneously admitted because it is expert testimony about the defendant’s state of mind.”). The above list is merely an example of the types of expert opinions law enforcement officers often try to offer at trial. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, though, any opinion testimony that is based on ys specialized “training and experience” is expert opinion testimony subject to Rule 702 and Rule 16(1)(G) and is inadmissible at trial. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 216. If the testimony of the government’s law enforcement officers is not properly limited, it is “likely to give [their] factual testimony an ‘unmerited credibility’ before the jury.” Mejia, 545 F.3d at 192 (2d Cir. 2008). See also United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1988) (“When the expert is a government law enforcement agent testifying on behalf of the especially problematic because juries may place greater weight on evidence perceived to have the imprimatur of the government. United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 119-20 (1st Cir. 2004). DOJ-OGR-00005753