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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 9 of 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 Advisory Committee’s Notes (2000 Amendments)). “TT |he law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.” Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 142 (emphasis in original); see United States v. Requena, 980 F.3d 30, 47 (2d Cir. 2020). Thus a district court may properly exercise its gatekeeping function without the “formality of a separate hearing[.]” Williams, 506 F.3d at 161; see also United States v. Barnes, 411 F. App’x 365, 370 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order). “This is particularly true if, at the time that the expert testimony is presented to the jury, a sufficient basis for allowing the testimony is on the record.” Williams, 506 F.3d at 161 (citing 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702.02 [2] (2d ed. 2006)). Finally, even if the expert testimony is reliable, it must also be relevant. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 20 Cr. 608 (DLC), 2021 WL 1947503, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2021). In this context, the testimony must “concern matters that the average juror is not capable of understanding on his or her own.” United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2008); see Faulkner v. Arista Records LLC, 46 F. Sup. 3d 365, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Weighing whether the expert testimony assists the trier of fact goes primarily to relevance.”). Courts have frequently admitted expert testimony on the psychological relationship between perpetrators and victims of sex crimes. For instance, in United States v. Kidd, 385 F. Supp. 3d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2019), the Government gave notice of expert testimony on “the psychology of the pimp-prostitute relationship,” including concepts such as “trauma bonding.” Jd. at 263. The defendant interposed a Daubert challenge, arguing that the expert’s testimony was not based on “studies or empirical data” and so could not “be assessed for reliability.” /d. (internal DOJ-OGR- 00005792