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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 14 of 84 some sort of empirical scientific testing,” and that “those arguments go to the weight, not the admissibility, of her proposed testimony”). As noted above, courts have frequently admitted testimony about the psychological relationship between victims of sexual abuse and their perpetrators. See supra pp. 7-8. Courts have also specifically authorized expert testimony on the subject of grooming. See, e.g., United States v. Telles, 6 F.4th 1086, 1097-1098 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that admission of expert testimony on grooming did not violate Federal Rules of Evidence 702 or 403 nor violate due coe process and finding that the expert “‘merely gave a straightforward account of relevant background 999 information based on [the expert’s] own knowledge and experience’” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 860 F.3d 1133, 1141 (8th Cir. 2017)); United States v. Halamek, 5 F 4th 1081, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that expert testimony on grooming was “relevant, reliable, and properly admitted”); United States v. Isabella, 918 F.3d 816, 833 n.15 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Grooming can be established by use of an expert witness who testifies about psychological tactics that are common in cases of child sex abuse.”); United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 158 (Sth Cir. 2006) (affirming expert testimony on the “grooming process”); Morris v. State, 361 S.W.3d 649, 656-69 (Tx. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (collecting cases showing that “grooming evidence has been received by courts from numerous types of experts”); see also United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Cabrera, 13 F.4th 140 (2d Cir. 2021) (noting that evidence of grooming supported the jury’s verdict). Against this weight of authority, the defendant relies principally on one case from the District of Maine. United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Me. 2010). The proposed 13 DOJ-OGR-00005797