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enrichment. And yet Iran also chose to convert some of its stockpile of
highly enriched uranium for medical use rather than approach the amount
needed for a bomb, leading Israeli authorities to predict that Iran wouldn't
be able to build a bomb before 2015 or 2016. Last week, Ali Akbar
Velayati, Khamenei's foreign policy advisor, publicly criticized officials
who have treated the negotiations dismissively. Presumably, he was
thinking of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has compared Iran's
nuclear program to a train without brakes.
Iran is now at the outset of what promises to be a raucous presidential
election, and may be no more capable of serious negotiations between now
and June than the United States was in 2012. But what is clear is that the
sanctions have moderated Iranian behavior and rhetoric. At the same time,
as the Times also noted, the economic pressure is not nearly great enough
to compel concessions that the regime would view as a blow to national
pride. In short, Iran might -- might -- be more willing to accept a face-
saving compromise than they were a year or two ago, but will need serious
inducements to do so.
What would that entail? Virtually all the proposals that have come from
outside experts suggest that the P5+1 begin with modest confidence-
building measures, especially in the period before the election. A recent
report by the Arms Control Association enumerates several of them.
Western diplomats, for example, could take up Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's
foreign minister, on his proposal to limit the "extent" of enrichment -- 1.e.,
well below 20 percent -- in exchange for fuel rods for the research reaction
and a recognition of Iran's "right to enrich," a notional concept the United
States already supports under specified conditions. Or Iran could suspend
20-percent enrichment in exchange for a suspension of new sanctions. But
Iran is unlikely to accept even such small steps unless it felt that additional
moves would win additional explicit concessions.
Beyond that, the outlines of what in Middle East peacemaking is known as
"final status" are clear enough: Iran agrees to verifiable inspections to
ensure that it does not enrich uranium beyond 3.5 percent and does not
pursue a nuclear weapons program, while the West accepts Iran's "right to
enrich" and dismantles sanctions. Of course, the outlines of a Middle East
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