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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 397 Filed 10/29/21 Page 53 of 84 because evidence was “pertinent to whether he used the internet in an attempt to engage in sexual conduct with” putative victim). The defense argues that this testimony will be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. According to the defense, if Minor Victim-3 testifies that she had sex with a “much older man when she was 17 years old” or that she was sexually abused, the jury will assume that Epstein engaged in illegal conduct, which will somehow prejudice the defendant. (Def. Mot. 4 at 13). The Court should not assume that the jury will speculate about principles of United Kingdom law and apply them to this case. The Court will properly instruct the jury on the elements of the offenses charged in the Indictment and the evidence that the jury can—and cannot— consider. Those instructions will not ask the jury to consider or pass upon any aspect of United Kingdom law, which will not be in evidence at trial. And in any event, as discussed in the Government’s opposition to the defendant’s pretrial motion to strike references to Minor Victim- 3 in the Indictment, evidence regarding Minor Victim-3’s experiences with the defendant and Epstein are no more inflammatory or upsetting than those of Minor Victim-1 and Minor Victim- 2. The risk of unfair prejudice is therefore minimal. In the alternative, the defense seeks three rulings: (1) precluding the Government from referring to Minor Victim-3 as a “minor,” (2) precluding the Government and Minor Victim-3 from representing that she was “sexually abused” by Epstein, and (3) giving a limiting instruction about United Kingdom law. The defense’s requested rulings are not grounded in law or reason. First, the defense claims that Minor Victim-3 should not be referred to as a “minor” because she was above the age of consent in the relevant jurisdictions at the times she had sexual contact 52 DOJ-OGR-00005836