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/ BARAK / 92 Still, in my meetings with Clinton, I assured him I was not giving up altogether on the prospects for peace. Not only did I feel that would be wrong, as long as there was a scintilla of hope. I believed that our continued diplomatic engagement might provide a counterweight to any moves by Arafat to revert to violence. It was also critical for Israel to retain the diplomatic, political and moral high ground we had earned in the eyes of the international community from the concessions we had been willing to consider. When the President suggested drafting a final American paper, based on Camp David though presumably with an even more generous proposal for the Palestinians, I agreed. I figured even Arafat might realize at some point that if he did want a negotiated peace, the time for dithering was over. Clinton would no longer be president in five months’ time. Unless I could find an alternative way to refortify my coalition over the coming weeks, it was entirely possible I'd have to form a “unity” coalition with Ank and the Likud. Still, I told President Clinton I doubted the ticking clock would make a difference to the Palestinian leader. If it didn’t, I believed at some point all our talk about an “end of conflict” would give way to conflict. The only question was when. Tragically, I got the answer only weeks after my return from the UN. At the urging of the Americans, I invited Arafat and his negotiating team to a private dinner in Kochav Yair on the 25th of September. The atmosphere was surprisingly warm, for which a lot of the credit, as well as culinary praise, has to go to Nava. “Very cordial, even congenial,” Nabil Shaath told reporters after the dinner, nearly 45 minutes of which I spent talking alone with Arafat on the stone terrace out back. Each of us spoke to Clinton for about 10 minutes near the end, and the President was obviously pleased to hear us sounding upbeat about trying to narrow any differences on the forthcoming American negotiating paper. On the substance of our differences, by mutual agreement, Arafat and I didn’t say much to each other. I did try to impress on him that time was getting short. His monosyllabic reply — yes — was at least better than the alternative. I chose to believe we could both now focus on trying again. 378 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028226