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Cite as: 586 U.S. (2019) 15 Opinion of the Court And even if an international development bank’s lend- ing activity does qualify as commercial, that does not mean the organization is automatically subject to suit. The FSIA includes other requirements that must also be met. For one thing, the commercial activity must have a sufficient nexus to the United States. See 28 U.S.C. §§1608, 1605(a)(2). For another, a lawsuit must be “based upon” either the commercial activity itself or acts per- formed in connection with the commercial activity. See §1605(a)(2). Thus, if the “gravamen” of a lawsuit is tor- tious activity abroad, the suit is not “based upon” commer- cial activity within the meaning of the FSIA’s commercial activity exception. See OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U.S. , __—___ (2015); Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 356-859 (1998). At oral argument in this case, the Government stated that it has “serious doubts” whether petitioners’ suit, which largely concerns allegedly tortious conduct in India, would satisfy the “based upon” require- ment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-26. In short, restrictive immun- ity hardly means unlimited exposure to suit for interna- tional organizations. * * * The International Organizations Immunities Act grants international organizations the “same immunity” from suit “as is enjoyed by foreign governments” at any given time. Today, that means that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act governs the immunity of international organizations. The International Finance Corporation is therefore not absolutely immune from suit. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028557