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Thursday, September 12, 2013 Page 7 Moreover, the discovery that Edwards pursued has to be considered against the backdrop of Epstein’s obstructionist tactics. In both this case and all other cases filed against him, Epstein asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege rather than answer any substantive questions. Epstein also helped secure attorneys for his household staff who assisted in the process of recruiting the minor girls, and those staff members in turn also asserted their Fifth Amendment rights rather than explain what happened behind closed doors in Epstein’s mansion in West Palm Beach. It is against this backdrop that Edwards followed up on one of the only remaining lines of inquiry open to him: discovery aimed at those of Epstein’s friends reasonably believed to have been in a position to corroborate the fact that Epstein was sexually abusing young girls. In the context of the sexual assault cases that Edwards had filed against Epstein, any act of sexual abuse had undeniable relevance to the case — even acts of abuse Epstein committed against minor girls other than L.M., E.W., or Jane Doe. Both federal and state evidence rules made acts of child abuse against other girls admissible in the plaintiffs case in chief as proof of “modus operandi” or “motive” or “common scheme or plan.” The anxiously anticipated trial of this case will present the first full disclosure of the evidence of the extent of Epstein’s criminal conduct in explanation of the reason for and the extent of his malice toward Bradley Edwards. Epstein’s repeated invocations of the Fifth Amendment raise adverse inferences against him that leave no possibility that a reasonable factfinder could have ever reached a verdict in his favor. Instead, a reasonable finder of fact could only find that Epstein was a serial molester of children who was being held accountable through legitimate suits brought by Edwards and others on behalf of the minor girls that Epstein victimized. “[I]t is well-settled that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.” Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); accord Vasquez v. State, 777 So.2d 1200, 1203 (Fla. App. 2001). The reason for this rule “is both logical and utilitarian. A party may not trample upon the rights of others and then escape the consequences by invoking a constitutional privilege — at least not in a civil setting.” Fraser v. Security and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla. 4"" Dist. Ct. App. 1993). And, in the proper circumstances, “’Silence is often evidence of the most persuasive character.’” Fraser v. Security and Inv. Corp., 615 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla. 4" Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-154 (1923) (Brandeis, J.). In the circumstances of this case, a reasonable finder of fact would have “evidence of the most persuasive character” from Epstein’s repeated refusal to answer questions propounded to him. To provide but a few examples, here are questions that Epstein HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029321