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20 ASEAN claimants. But a second such incident occurred on June 9 — only two weeks later. Earlier, on March 4, the Philippines protested an incident on the Reed Bank in which two Chinese patrol boats allegedly threatened to ram a Philippine survey ship. Then on the eve of Gen. Liang's visit to Manila, Chinese fighter jets allegedly harassed members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines near disputed islands in the South China Sea. China responded to frenetic protests from Vietnam and the Philippines that any exploration in the Spratly area without its consent is a violation of its jurisdiction and sovereignty. This real time link between its stark and sweeping position and its enforcement has sent a chill down the spines of other ASEAN claimant and drawn U.S. attention. These disputes and even such incidents are certainly not new but why are they occurring now, and why is China sending very mixed signals? This was supposed to be a period of negotiations to transform the DOC into an official enforceable code. Needless to say, this effort may now be moribund. Despite China's rhetoric, ASEAN nations are genuinely alarmed and are looking to the United States for succor and support. The U.S. — having confronted China and injected itself into the issue via U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's speech at the ARF Foreign Minister's meeting in Hanoi in July 2010 — is only too happy to help — at least verbally and with signals that militaries understand. The great irony is that none of this was necessary for China. Its problem with the U.S., or vice versa, concerns the intelligence- gathering activities of U.S. military vessels and aircraft — the EP-3, the Impeccable, the Victorious, the Bowditch in what it claims 1s its waters — not conflicting claims to islands or ocean space. These can only be linked in one worst scenario: that China has decided that it disagrees with portions of the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty that it HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029951