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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 _ Filed 11/08/21 Page19 of 41 parties can argue in closing arguments.” deWit v. UPS Ground Freight, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 36, 2017 WL 5905575, at *2 (N.D. Fl. Jul. 25, 2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). So too here. The defense’s offer of Dr. Dietz’s opinions on hindsight bias to “temper” the jurors’ assessment of the evidence is thus virtually unprecedented. If this Court allowed such testimony in this case, however, it would likely become much more common. This Court should decline to open the door to the routine psychoanalysis of the jury in this way. 3. Opinions as to the “Halo Effect” Dr. Dietz’s opinions concerning the “Halo effect”—1.e., that “the positive evaluation of one characteristic has a radiating effect on how other, non-related characteristics of the individual are evaluated” (Ex. A at 5)—are irrelevant to any issue to be considered by the jury and appear to be offered in an effort to encourage jury nullification by engendering sympathy for the defendant, as well as to offer a factual narrative based on no reliable evidence through a witness plainly incompetent to do so. None of the charges in this case relate in any way to the defendant’s appraisal of Jeffrey Epstein’s character or whether the defendant did or did not view him in the manner suggested by the Halo effect. Simply put, if every word that Dr. Dietz said regarding the “Halo effect” and Epstein’s “brilliance” in exploiting it were taken as true, the defendant would be guilty if she met the elements of the charged offenses—exactly as she would be if every word Dr. Dietz said on this 3 Accordingly, even if the defense somehow put at issue whether a witness’s opinion on some matter was affected by hindsight bias—and the Government cannot currently envision how this is likely—the proper way of litigating an issue so squarely within the ken of the jury is through lay evidence and argument, not expert testimony. See deWit, 2017 WL 5905575, at *2. 15 DOJ-OGR-00006230