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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 30 of 41 2. “[Hlow memory becomes more vulnerable to contamination.” 3. “[T]he mechanism by which false and/or distorted memories can be created as a result of post-event information and occurrences, suggestion, influence or the like.” 4. “(T]he effects of suggestion on memory,” including how “[s]uggestive activities can explain how it is that a person might go from having no memory of sexual abuse, and even denying sexual abuse, to later having [memories] for numerous abusive acts, if the memories are false.” 5. “[T] he characteristics of false and/or distorted memories” . . . “[i]n particular,” that: a. Such memories “can be described with confidence, detail and emotion, even when they are false”; and b. “[P]eople come to believe in these experiences and are not deliberately lying.” 6. “[Identification of] some of the suggestive activities that occurred in the current case,” including “media coverage and other publications (including but not limited to newspaper and magazine articles, news reports, television shows, documentaries, books, podcasts, websites, etc.) and discussions/conversations with others, can be sources of suggestion.” 7. “[H]ow, in a case like this one, suggestion can lead individuals to the construction of distorted memories.” (Ex. A at 1-2 (emphasis added)). As set forth below, the Government objects that some of these opinions (paragraphs 1, 2, 5(b), and 6) are commonsense principles within the ken of the jury; some (paragraphs 5(a) and 5(b)) invade the province of the jury in assessing witness credibility and demeanor; some (paragraphs 6 and 7) are vehicles to insert factual narrative about the case; and some (paragraph 3) are unreliable and lack fit with the case. B. Applicable Law As a general matter, memory, perception, and the fallibility of human recall—that is, how people may remember, misremember, or forget past events—are within the ken of the jury. See United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 950 (7th Cir. 2005) (“In general . . . jurors understand that memory can be less than perfect.”); United States v. Smith, 148 F. App’x 867, 872 (11th Cir. 2005) 26 DOJ-OGR-00006241