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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 424 Filed 11/08/21 Page 33 of 41 More recently, federal courts have been more receptive to allowing expert testimony beyond general principles of human recall on a case-by-case basis, depending on the special circumstances or particular facts of a case and only when such opinions are based on reliable science and fit the facts of the case. See, e.g., Libby, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 9-10 (“There is no clear case authority, or absolute rule, on when an expert should be permitted to testify on issues regarding memory and perception. . . . [T]here is no per se rule for or against the admissibility of such testimony [on memory and perception]. And a court presented with a proffer of expert testimony must determine its admissibility on a case-by-case basis.” (citing cases)); Shiraishi, 2019 WL 1386365, at *3 (discussing the need for the expert testimony to “fit” the evidence or facts of the particular case); Shohola, 2019 WL 6053223, at *10-13 (“First, courts have recognized that expert testimony concerning the vagaries of human recollection that is stated with sufficient certainty, is grounded upon reliable science, and fits the facts of the case satisfies the Daubert standard and should be admitted at trial. In contrast, expert opinions regarding the science of human recollection that are not presented with certainty, lack scientific rigor, or possess only a tenuous factual fit are often excluded from evidence.” (citing United States v. Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 336 (3d Cir. 2001))). Courts, however, must exercise “judicial oversight” in this area. See Shohola, 2019 WL 6053223, at *10-13. “Left unregulated, memory expert testimony can invade the fundamental province of the jury—determining witness credibility,” and must be excluded as unduly prejudicial Loftus’s testimony and noting that the issues identified were more appropriate to explore during cross-examination). 29 DOJ-OGR-00006244