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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 438 Filed 11/12/21 Page 29 of 54 Dep’t of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility Report, Dkt. No 293 Ex. A). Discussion of those issues would be all the more confusing to the jury because it involves decisions of a different prosecuting authority, because the USAO-SDFL resolved its investigation before significant investigative steps were completed, and because the USAO-SDFL investigation did nonetheless generate inculpatory material as to the defendant. To evaluate the evidence, jurors would also need to understand the sequencing of the various investigations into Epstein and the defendant, so they could understand which witnesses and evidence were available to which law enforcement agencies and prosecutors at what times. The history of various investigations into Epstein reaches back 20 years, and a review of that history would create an extensive sideshow. Any marginal probative value of evidence of the Government’s charging decisions is substantially outweighed by the extended digression and confusion that such evidence would require. Third, eliciting information about past charging decisions would be hearsay. See White, 692 F.3d at 244-45 (declining to decide whether the evidence in that case was hearsay); id. at 253 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“[A]s the majority opinion observes, hearsay problems abound in this case; yet, since neither party raised these issues on appeal, the Court has not decided whether the charging documents . . . are admissible hearsay.”). Those charging decisions were made internally by prosecutors at the USAO-SDFL or at this Office. No prosecutors from either office are testifying at trial, and no witness testifying at this trial can explain the Government’s past charging decisions. Any knowledge that an FBI agent has, or that a witness has, about the basis for a prior charging decision is based on statements made by prosecutors, which are themselves 28 DOJ-OGR-00006389