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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 438 Filed 11/12/21 Page 49 of 54
power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an
exercise of erroneously seized power.” (emphasis in original)).
Even if a defendant offers character evidence, that evidence may not include specific
instances of good conduct, unless the defendant’s character is an “essential element” of the
offense. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) & 405; see, e.g., United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 792 &
n.77 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Nachamie, 28 F. App’x 13, 20-21 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary
order). Character evidence is only admissible “by testimony about the person’s reputation or by
testimony in the form of an opinion.” Fed. R. Evid. 405(a); see, e.g., United States v. Riley, 638
F. App’x 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order) (“The limitations imposed by the district court
followed directly from the Rules of Evidence, which permit a defendant to offer evidence of a
personal opinion or his reputation for a pertinent character trait, but not to offer testimony
regarding ‘specific instances’ of conduct in conformity with a trait that is not at issue.” (citations
omitted)).
The Government is unaware of any relevant reason for the jury to consider the
defendant’s charitable activities, family history, or similar facts. Because those facts have
nothing to do with her guilt or innocence, and they are not permissible character evidence, she
should be precluded from mentioning such subjects in her opening statement, during the
presentation of evidence, or in closing statements, absent a ruling that a specific fact is relevant
and more probative than unfairly prejudicial.
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Dates
Document Details
| Filename | DOJ-OGR-00006409.jpg |
| File Size | 601.2 KB |
| OCR Confidence | 93.5% |
| Has Readable Text | Yes |
| Text Length | 1,712 characters |
| Indexed | 2026-02-03 17:10:56.104090 |