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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 453 Filed 11/12/21 Page 26 of 52 situation here, in which the alleged “groomer” was not the person who perpetrated the alleged abuse. e Even where the “groomer” and “perpetrator” are the same person, courts have recognized the unreliability of grooming testimony. United States v. Gonyer, No. 1:12-CR-00021-JAW, 2012 WL 3043020, at *2-3 (D. Me. July 24, 2012); United States v. Raymond, 700 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146-47 (D. Me. 2010); United States v. Schneider, No. CRIM.A. 10-29, 2010 WL 3734055, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2010); see also United States v. Raniere, No. 18-CR-2041-NGG-VMS, 2019 WL 2212639, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2019); United States v. Burns, No. 07 CR 556, 2009 WL 3617448, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2009) (criticizing the “grooming theory” in the context of a sentencing guidelines calculation). e The government tries to distinguish United States v. Raymond by saying that the expert’s own book in that case “disavow[ed] [its] reliability . . . for legal use.” Resp. at 14. But that is exactly the situation here, because the primary article on which the government relies—Exhibit A to its response—flatly says “that grooming is not a construct that ought to be used in forensic settings as it does not meet some of the criteria in the Daubert standard.” Resp., Ex. A, p 19. e The government says Rocchio’s opinions are not “anecdotal.” But that’s not right either, as her endorsement makes clear: Rocchio’s opinions are based “‘on her education and training on psychological trauma, traumatic stress, interpersonal violence, and sexual abuse /and her] extensive clinical experience treating individuals who suffered sexual abuse and trauma in childhood and adolescence, 20 DOJ-OGR-00006906