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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 492 Filed 11/22/21 Page10of13 Page 10 beginning with a foot massage; (4) whether the defendant knew those massages were sexualized; (5) whether she intended to arrange sexualized massages for Epstein; (6) whether she asked the girls to find additional girls to massage Epstein; (7) whether Epstein and the defendant invited people they had recruited for sexualized massages to travel; and (8) whether the defendant had any motive for doing any of this activity. Ifthe defense wants to concede that she had this knowledge and intent, or that she played these roles, but only as to adults, it might reduce the probative value of evidence related to Minor Victim-3. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 2012) (“A defendant may . . . forestall the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence by advancing a theory that makes clear that the object the Rule 404(b) evidence seeks to establish, while technically at issue, is not really in dispute.”).? But to the extent that the defense argues that the defendant was not aware at all that Epstein’s massages were sexualized, for instance, or that she played no role in recruiting masseuses for Epstein at all, this evidence is highly probative to rebut those arguments. At its core, the defense argument is that the fact that the defendant and Epstein recruited a seventeen-year-old in the United Kingdom to provide sexualized massages to Epstein and to travel with them is not probative of whether they recruited a minor in the United States to provide sexualized massages to Epstein and to travel with them. The argument is meritless. This evidence 3 Bither way, Minor Victim-3’s testimony would still be relevant at least on the issue of motive. See Siddiqui, 699 F.3d at 702. * To be clear, the evidence is admissible for the sex trafficking counts as well as the Mann Act counts. See, e.g., Curley, 639 F.3d at 59 (“Although the incidents pre-dated the charged conduct by as much as fifteen years, collectively they demonstrate a pattern of activity that continued up to the time of the charged conduct.”); United States v. Ulbricht, 79 F. Supp. 3d 466, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“While the duration of elapsed time between two events can detract from the probative value of the prior event, temporal remoteness of acts does not preclude their relevancy.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). DOJ-OGR-00007427