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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 499 Filed 11/23/21 Page 8of28 A. Response to Dr. Rocchio’s Proposed Testimony. The government challenges what it characterizes as four opinions Dr. Dietz might offer in response to testimony from Dr. Rocchio.! As explained below, though, Dr. Dietz’s testimony is responsive to Dr. Rocchio’s testimony in more than the four narrow ways identified by the government. In addition, much of his proposed testimony has independent relevance. In any event, none of the government’s challenges is persuasive. First, the government challenges Dr. Dietz’s proposed testimony (1) that Dr. Rocchio’s opinion on grooming “carries the risk of imputing motive and intent to the Defendant,” that “Dr. Rocchio’s proposed testimony is silent as to whether she is expected to impute a theory of ‘grooming-by-proxy’ to the defendant,” and that “Ms. Maxwell is not accused of soliciting or enticing sexualized massages for herself,” but instead that she allegedly “recruited and groomed minors to provide sexualized massages for Mr. Epstein.” Mot. at 10. The government says these three opinions are inadmissible “legal” conclusions suitable only for a Daubert hearing and not for the jury trial. It is perfectly appropriate for Dr. Dietz to opine that Dr. Rocchio’s definition of “srooming” risks “imputing motive and intent” to the defendant because that is precisely why there is no settled, clinical definition of grooming, which the government has conceded is a proper subject of Dr. Dietz’s expert opinions. Supra Note 1; Ex. 1, p 3-4. Surely Dr. Dietz can inform the jury why the science does not support Dr. Rocchio’s definition of grooming. Dr. Dietz will not himself (and Dr. Rocchio cannot herself) ascribe motive or intent to Ms. Maxwell, nor will he testify that the jury lacks sufficient evidence to ascribe motive and ' The government agrees Dr. Dietz can inform the jury that Dr. Rocchio is wrong to suggest that grooming has a settled definition. Mot. at 9. DOJ-OGR-00007473