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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document517 _ Filed 11/30/21 Page3of4 give rise to good cause for a belated disclosure.! Absent such a showing, however, new defense exhibits should be precluded or, at a minimum, ordered to be disclosed forthwith. To the extent the defense anticipates offering exhibits for impeachment, as a general matter, “extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). This rule is subject to certain exceptions. For instance, as the parties agreed this afternoon, extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior statement is not barred by Rule 608. Fed. R. Evid. 613. The Rules also permit “other grounds of impeachment (such as contradiction, prior inconsistent statement, bias, and mental capacity).” United States v. Johnson, 469 F. Supp. 3d 193, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) Advisory Committee Notes). But even then, “[e]xtrinsic evidence offered for impeachment on a collateral issue is properly excluded.” United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 245-46 (2d Cir. 1998); see United Sates v. Dore, No. 12 Cr. 45 (RJS), 2013 WL 3965281, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013) (Sullivan, J.) [T]he Second Circuit has held . . . that introduction of extrinsic proof of a prior inconsistent statement is only appropriate as it relates to matters which are not collateral, i.e., as to those matters which are relevant to the issues in the case and could be independently proven.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the defense may offer extrinsic evidence for impeachment, if the defense articulates an appropriate exception to the general prohibition on such evidence described above. ‘To be clear, good cause is not established simply because the defense has not made a final determination as to what evidence they intend to introduce—a position that effectively renders Rule 16 a nullity. See, e.g., United States v. Rajaratnam, No. $2 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2011 WL 723530, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2011) (“A defendant would always like more information about the government’s case before revealing anything about his or her own, but Rule 16 conditions a defendant’s disclosure obligations on the government’s having made certain specified disclosures, not on the government’s laying open its entire case or the defendant’s satisfaction.”’). 3 DOJ-OGR-00008192

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Filename DOJ-OGR-00008192.jpg
File Size 799.4 KB
OCR Confidence 93.7%
Has Readable Text Yes
Text Length 2,429 characters
Indexed 2026-02-03 17:32:26.422992