EFTA00221703.pdf

Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PggigleQff bf 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 So.2d 1076.22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375.23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District. Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners, v. Marjorie A. RUZZO, and Exec., Inc., etc., Re- spondents. No. 97-82. Page 1 307Ak31 k. Relevancy and Materiality. Most Cited Cases Party may be permitted to discover evidence that would be inadmissible at trial, if it would lead to discovery of relevant evidence. West's F.S.A. RCP Rule 1.280(6)(1). (3) Pretrial Procedure WA 4:=36.1 Oct. 10, 1997. As Mortified on Grant of Clarification Jan. 2, 1998. 307A Pretrial Procedure reY. der.‘e ?" s Se..7-ck 251(o t• 307All Depositions and Discovery Plaintiffs brought action against alleged house of %ann. 307A11(A) Discovery in General prostitution for, inter alia, coercion of prostitution. 307Ak36 Particular Subjects of Disclos ure - The Circuit Court, Brevard County. Frank Pound, 307Ak36.1 k. In General. Most Cited J., granted in part defendants' motion to compel dis- covery. Plaintiffs filed petition for writ of certior- ari. The District Court of Appeal, W. Sharp, .1., held that evidence of plaintiffs' past prostitution and their revenues relating to such activities was dis- coverable. Petition denied. Harris, J., concurred specially and filed opinion. West Headnotes (I) Pretrial Procedure 307A rii:=D31 307A Pretrial Procedure 307All Depositions and Discovery 307A11(A) Discovery in General 307Ak31 k. Relevancy and Materiality. Most Cited Cases Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to subject matter of case and must be admissible or reason- ably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. West's F.S.A. RCP Rule 1.280(bX1). [2) Pretrial Procedure 307A te=031 307A Pretrial Procedure 307A11 Depositions and Discovery 307A11(A) Discovery in General Cases Evidence of plaintiffs past prostitution and their revenues relating to such activities, including activ- ities with alleged house of prostitution against which they had filed suit, was discoverable, where plaintiffs brought action not only for coercion of prostitution, but also for battery, false imprison- ment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of their civil rights, and racketeering. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, § 40302, 42 U.S.C.A. 13981; West's F.S.A. §§ 772.014, 796.09; West's F.S.A. RCP Rule 1280(b)(1). *1076 Richard E. Johnson and Heather Fisher Lind- say, of Spriggs a Johnson, Tallahassee, for Peti- tioners. Mark S. Peters of Amari, Theriac & Esenmenger, P.A., Cocoa, for Respondents. W. SHARP. Judge. Bales and Shumate petition this court for a writ of certiorari to review certain portions of the lower court's order which granted, in part, a motion to compel discovery filed by respondents Ruzzo and Exec., Inc. Petitioners argue that those portions de- part from the essential requirements of law and will cause them irreparable harm because they will be 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. Ar( 41 EXHIBIT Imp://web2.westlaw.com/printiprintstream.aspx'?sv=Spl it&prft=HTMLE8dfrn=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221703 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PMegi 2f of 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly 13169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) compelled to disclose intimate details of their sexu- al history. We decline to issue the writ of certiorari. Balas and Shumate filed suit against Ruzzo and Ex- ec, Inc., doing business as "The Boardroom." Ac- cording to Balas and Shumate, The Boardroom op- erates ostensibly as *1077 a leisure spa but actually is a house of prostitution. Batas worked at The Boardroom from December 1993 until February 1996; Shumate worked there from October 1992 until March 1996. Ruzzo, the sole officer and shareholder of Exec, Inc., collected about fifty to sixty percent of each employee& earnings from per- forming sexual acts. According to Batas and Shumate, Ruzzo exerted mental and emotional control over her employees and thus she was able to exploit them as prostitutes. Ruzzo required her employees to pay her substan- tial sums of money to attend "metaphysical work- shops" conducted by Ruzzo or persons associated with her. At the work place, the employees were re- quired to participate in religious and quasi-religious "circles," rituals and incantations. These practices were allegedly designed to break down the person- alities of the women who worked for Ruzzo and to foster dependency and loyalty to herself. At one time when the earnings of a new employee were missing and believed to be stolen, Ruzzo required that the petitioners be strip searched and body cav- ity searched. Ruzzo caused the petitioners to be- lieve their continued employment was dependent on their submission to these searches and that they might be arrested on felony charges if they refused to submit to the searches. Bales and Shumate's second amended complaint against Ruzzo contains seven counts. Count I is an action for coercion of prostitution pursuant to sec- tion 796.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioners allege the requirement that they perform sexual acts to retain their employment constitutes inducement and coer- cion to engage in prostitution. Count II is a claim for battery for the unwanted and offensive touching of the petitioners' bodies. Count III is a claim for false imprisonment for physically confining the pe- Page 2 titioners against their will. Count IV alleges that re- spondents' actions constituted an invasion of peti- tioners privacy. Count V is a claim for the inten- tional infliction of emotional distress. Count VI al- leges a civil rights action-that respondents have vi- olated petitioners' right to be free from crimes of vi- olence motivated by gender within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. section 13981. Finally, count VII seeks civil remedies for criminal practices or racketeering pursuant to section 772.104, Florida Statutes. The petitioners claim that they suffered emotional pain, anguish, humiliation, insult, indignity, loss of self- esteem, inconvenience, hurt and emotional distress. They seek an award of general and punitive dam- ages, among other relief. The discovery to which the petitioners are being re- quired to respond is as follows: 1. Interrogatory 8: Please advise how long have you been engaged in prostitution.... H. Interrogatory 22: State with specificity the man- ner in which the acts as described in your Corn- plaint have materially affected how you interact with your husband, boyfriend, fiancée (sic] or any other individual of the opposite sex. Request for Production 30: A copy of any photo- graphs, movies or videotapes in which you per- formed sexual acts and/or simulated sexual acts in exchange for money or other consideration. IV. Interrogatory 16: Please list the names, addresses, telephone numbers and rates of pay for all em- ployers for which you worked, including the ilt) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx7sv=Split&prft=HTMLEScifm=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221704 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PASege(Ygf 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Ha. L. Weekly 13169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) nature of the work, during the five years immedi- ately preceding the date of employment with the Boardroom and from the date of your termination with the Boardroom to the present, providing the names of your immediate supervisors at each place of employment and the reason for your leaving each place of employment. V. Interrogatory 26: Please state your total income while employed at the Boardroom, and state the source of that income including any income from other employment or *1078 income earned from prostitution other than at the Boardroom. VI. Request for Production 34: Business records from any selfemployment or owned business ventures in the last 5 years, including any records or list of customers, "special customer lists" or "sugar daddy's list." 11)(21 Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to the subject matter of the case and must be admiss- ible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91 (Fla.l995); Amerce v. Newman, 653 So.2d 1030 (Fla.1995); Russell v. Stardust Cruis- ers, Inc., 690 So.2d 743 (Ha. 5th DCA 1997). The concept of relevancy is broader in the discovery context than in the trial context and a party may be permitted to discover evidence that would be inad- missible at trial, if it would lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. Allstate; Amente. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(1) delineates the proper scope of discovery: In General. Parties may obtain discovery regard- ing any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter of the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, Page 3 nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having know- ledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis- covery of admissible evidence. Nonetheless, the discovery of certain kinds of in- formation may cause material injury of an irrepar- able nature. This includes the "cat-out-of-the-bag" material that could be used to injure another person or party outside the context of the litigation, materi- al protected by privilege, trade secrets or work product. Discovery was never intended to be used as a tactical tool to harass, embarrass or annoy one's adversary. Rather, pretrial discovery was im- plemented to simplify the issues in a case, to elim- inate the elements of surprise, to encourage the set- tlement of cases, to avoid the cost of litigation, and to achieve a balanced search for the truth to ensure a fair trial. Elkins v. Syken, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla.1996). Here the petitioners argue that the information sought to be discovered regarding prostitution and their sexual activities was propounded solely to em- barrass them and to invade their right to privacy. The petitioners also claim that this information is privileged under section 796.09 and is not calcu- lated to lead to evidence which would be admiss- ible at trial. Section 796.09 provides a person with a civil cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against anyone who coerces that person into prosti- tution, who coerces that person to remain in prosti- tution, or who uses coercion to collect or receive any part of that person's earnings derived from prostitution. In the course of litigation under this section, any transaction about which a plaintiff test- ifies or produces evidence does not subject the plaintiff to criminal prosecution or to any penalty or forfeiture. In addition, any testimony or evidence or any information produced by the plaintiff or wit- ti) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstrcam.aspx?sv=Split&prft=1.ITMLE&ifm-NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221705 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 % eget& 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 Sold 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly 13169 (Cite as: 703 Sold 1076) ness for the plaintiffs cannot be used against the plaintiffs or witness in any other investigation or proceeding, except one for perjury. Section 796.09(5) specifically provides that it is not a defense that the plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated for prostitution, that the plaintiff had engaged in prostitution prior to any involvement with the defendant or that the plaintiff made no at- tempt to escape from the defendant. Section 796.09(6) provides that convictions for prostitution or prostitution-related offenses are inadmissible for the purpose of attacking the plaintiffs' credibility. This legislation was the result of the Florida Su- preme Court Gender Bias Study Commission, which conducted an extensive investigation of pros- titution in this state. The Commission's activities included interviews with law enforcement and cor- rections personnel,s1079 judges, public defenders. prosecutors, drug rehabilitation counselors, social workers, medical personnel, prostitutes, clients and pimps. The Commission found prostitution to be prevalent and uniform throughout the state and law enforcement largely unable to deter it under pre- vailing social attitudes and judicial practices. The Commission further found that prostitutes are often victims of economic, physical, and psychological coercion, that most persons do not chose to become prostitutes, but do so to survive, and that ninety percent of street prostitutes, both adult and chil- dren, are controlled by pimps who use a variety of coercive methods to maintain this control. The Commission determined that clients and pimps are rarely prosecuted and, when prosecuted, receive light sentences; whereas prostitutes, who are mainly females, are frequently prosecuted and receive harsher treatment in the courts. The Commission recommended changes in the methods of interven- tion in prostitution from punitive to therapeutic, changes in the law to require more equal treatment by the courts of the prostitute in relation to the cli- ent and the pimp and to lessen the incentive to traffic in human flesh by giving the prostitute ac- cess to the judicial system without first having to be arrested. Page 4 Under section 796.09, the petitioners' prior involve- ment in prostitution and their earnings from prosti- tution would be irrelevant. Hence discovery should not be permitted because such information would not be admissible at trial nor would it be reasonably calculated to lead to evidence ultimately admissible at trial. Even though the scope of discovery is gen- erally quite broad, section 796.09 is designed to en- courage prostitutes to sue their pimps. Thus the usually broad scope of discovery may be constric- ted so that prostitutes will not be embarrassed, har- assed or hindered in their actions. r3) Had the petitioners brought their lawsuit against Ruzzo and The Boardroom only under section 796.09, evidence of petitioners' past prostitution, including with the Boardroom, and their earnings relating to such activities, may not have been dis- coverable. However, the petitioners filed a multi- count complaint for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging numerous causes of action against the respondents. These other causes carry no such protection from discovery. Since the in- formation sought by discovery may be relevant or may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in one or more of these other causes of action or to determination of damages, we cannot conclude that the trial court departed from the essential require- ments of law in granting this discovery. See Smith v. TM Bank of the Keys, 687 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (by alleging fraud as well as breach of contract, purchaser placed at issue her reliance on venders' assertions, the veracity of financial docu- ments she submitted to the vender, and the state of her mental health, including memory problems she was experiencing at the time of the alleged tortious conduct, thus deposition questions concerning her state of mind were relevant). Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED. THOMPSON, J., concurs. HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opin- ion.HARRIS, Judge, concurring specially: © 2009 Thomson Renters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstrearmaspdsv=Split&prft-HTMLE&ifm—NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221706 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04:02/2009 P0leg (Of 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (ate as: 703 So.2d 1076) There is a temptation in cases such as this to inquire which, the pot or the kettle, is imbued with the darker hue. Indeed that may ultimately be the ques- tion uppermost in the jurors' minds. But the issue presently before us is simply whether the pot, in or- der to establish the parties' comparative complex- ion, may discover the historical condition and the inherent characteristics of the kettle. We are here involved with parties that the limited record before us indicates were co-conspirators in a joint effort to violate Florida's laws against prosti- tution. The defendants are the owner/operators of a "social club" whose primary service is prostitution; the plaintiffs are employees of the club who provide such services. The employees are suing the owner/operators for, among other counts, taking ad- vantage of their vulnerabilities ("coercing" them to be prostitutes) through manipulation and exploita- tion. In order to prepare a defense to the action, de- fendants have filed certain interrogatories for the employees to answer. These interrogatories*1080 request such information as how long the employ- ees have been engaged in prostitution; how the em- ployees have been affected by the defendants' con- duct; copies of photographs, movies, and video- tapes in which the employees have performed sexu- al acts or simulated sexual acts; the names of previ- ous employers and previous rates of pay; and a statement of income received from defendants. These interrogatories survived the employees' ob- jections. I agree certiorari should be denied. The employees primary cause of action is based on section 796.09(l), Florida Statutes, which provides: (1) A person has a cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages against: ',a) A person who coerces that person into prostitu- tion; b) A person who coerces that person to remain in prostitution, or ,,'c) A person who uses coercion to collect or receive Page 5 any part of that person's earnings derived from prostitution. The employees resist discovery of their past prosti- tution or their past or present earning experience on the basis of subparagraph 5 of section 796.09: '5) It does not constitute a defense to a complaint under this section that: a) The plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated for acts of prostitution; b) The plaintiff engaged in acts of prostitution pri- or to any involvement with the defendant ... But the question before us is not whether prior acts of prostitution (or the receipts of earnings there- from) which might be revealed by answering the in- terrogatories could be used as a defense to the com- plaint, but rather whether evidence of such conduct or such earnings would be relevant in determining whether the employees were, in fact, "coerced" into prostitution, into remaining prostitutes, or into shar- ing the proceeds of their services with defendants. The relevancy of this information depends, of course, on what constitutes coercion. If we apply the definition of "coercion" which is commonly accepted, then the relevancy of the re- quested information is apparent and this appeal has no merit at all. Webster defines "coercion" as: (1) to restrain or dominate by force, (2) to compel an act or choice, or (3) to enforce or bring about by force or threat. In sexual battery cases, the legis- lature has adopted the common meaning of the word "coercion" and has even placed limits on it. It has provided that consent will not be recognized if submission is coerced by threats of force or viol- ence if the victim reasonably believes the perpetrat- or has the present ability to execute the threat!'" Consent also will not be recognized if submission is coerced by a threat of retaliation against the victim or another if the victim reasonably believes that the perpetrator has the ability to execute the threat in the future.' 02 And in sexual battery cases, the le- gislature has vitiated what might otherwise be con- O 2009 Thomson Reuters/VVest. No Claim to Orig. US Oov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstresimaspx?sv-Split&prft=HTMLE&ifmNotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221707 PAvx 6 f Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 Page % of 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 S0.2(11076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (ate as: 703 So.2d 1076) sidered as consensual if one exploits a known phys- ical or mental weakness of the victim to achieve his or her goal or takes advantage of one who is phys- ically helpless or involuntarily intoxicated." Therefore, even in sexual battery cases, before co- ercion or exploitation will vitiate consent, the free will of the victim must be overcome by force or threat or some unfortunate circumstance suffered by the victim. WI. Section 794.011(4)(b), Florida Stat- utes. F142. Section 794.011(4)(c), Florida Stat- utes. FN3. Section 794.011(4)(4(d),K and (0, Florida Statutes. But then we get to the definition of "coercion" con- tained in section 796.09(3): ;3) As used in this section, the term "coercion" means any practice of dominion, restraint, or in- ducement for the purpose of or with the reason- ably foreseeable effect of causing another person to engage in or remain in prostitution or to relin- quish earnings derived from prostitution, and in- cludes, but is not limited to: 1,10 Physical force or threats of physical force 1,1)) Physical or mental torture. ;,c) Kidnapping. 01081 (d) Blackmail. ",e) Extortion or claims of indebtedness. 1,f) Threats of legal complaint or report of delin- quency. 4',) Threat to interfere with parental rights or re- sponsibilities, whether by judicial or administrat- ive action or otherwise. ',h) Promise of legal benefit. Page 6 1,1) Promise of greater financial rewards. 1,j) Promise of marriage. :k) Restraint of Speech or communications with others. ',/ ) Exploitation of a condition of developmental disability, cognitive limitation, affective disorder, or substance dependency. :m) Exploitation of victimization by sexual abuse. ',n) Exploitation of pornographic performance. :o) Exploitation of human needs for food, shelter, safety, or affection. The definition urged by the employees herein is the "promise of a greater financial reward." Whether the requested information is relevant to the issue of coercion in this case will depend on what the legis- lature intended by subsection (1) in the meaning of "coercion." 1 agree with Judge Altenbernd's thoughtful analysis in State v. Brigham, 694 So.2d 793 (1997): There can be no dispute that the legislature's unusu- al definition of "percent" is not a common dic- tionary definition- This is perhaps an appropriate case in which to remind ourselves of Learned Hand's famous observation that a -mature and de- veloped jurisprudence" does not "make a fortress out of the dictionary." But even so, one would expect some nexus between the commonly accepted meaning of a word and the definition of that word ascribed by the legislature. If, for example, the legislature defined "canine" as including cats, although one might, jurispruden- tially speaking, expect to hear a meow emanate from a Great Dane, the courts should nevertheless closely examine the legislative history to see if that is really what the legislature intended. The court in Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 69 N.W.2d 534, 537 (1955), stated this principle as follows: "But st 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sr•Split&prft,4-ITMLE&ifm=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221708 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PrAege 16 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076) before a definition is construed so as to expand the meaning of a well-known word to include its ant- onym ..., the intention of the legislature to that ef- fect must be clear." As Judge Campbell observed in Catron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 580 So.2d 814. 818 (Fla. 2t1 DCA 1991): It is our primary duty to give effect to legislative intent and, if a literal interpretation of a statute leads to unreasonable results, then we should ex- ercise our power to interpret reason and logic to it. Unfortunately, it is apparent that in enacting this le- gislation, the legislature has, without redefining the terms for the purposes of this legislation, of- ten used terms with commonly accepted mean- ings for purposes at great variance from those commonly accepted meanings. In our case, the legislature did define the term for the purpose of the act. But because the term (coercion) as so defined can be interpreted two ways-one consistent with the commonly accepted meaning and one at variance-we should not accept the "antonym" unless such legislative intent is clear. A free will decision, even if based on a hope of financial gain, is the opposite of a coerced de- cision. The employees urge that the mere promise of a greater reward brings them within the act. But if the mere promise of a greater reward is sufficient to es- tablish coercion, then anyone who makes a volun- tary and reasoned exercise of free will motivated by the hope of economic gain has been coerced. This definition removes the element of compulsion im- plicit in the commonly accepted meaning of coer- cion and substitutes therefor the mere desire for fin- ancial gain. The employees herein assert that since they were offered "a greater financial reward" for providing the services performed by them through defendants' establishment, they were coerced into their prostitution activities. This equates the giving Page 7 of an opportunity to make a decision with the coer- cion of that decision. But subsection (1) can also mean •1082 that the promise of a greater reward is coercion only if such promised reward is sufficient to overcome one's natural revulsion to selling one's body for money. If there is no such revulsion, there can be no coercion. Becoming a prostitute only be- cause one likes the hours and wages or "because it beats the heck out of working for a living" simply should not meet the test of section 796.09(1). At oral argument herein, it was suggested without contradiction, that at least one of the employees has a college degree and gave up a well-paying, legit- imate job in order to engage in this profession for the greater reward. Section 796.09 does not appear to be a general prostitute's relief act. It is based on a report by the Gender Bias Study Commission which recommended the equalization of treatment in rela- tion to the prostitute, the client and the "pimp." It is based on the premise thnt prostitutes are generally victims of economic, physical, and psychological coercion and choose prostitution in order to sur- vive. Further, the Commission was concerned that 90 percent of the street prostitutes are controlled by "pimps" who use a variety of coercive methods to maintain control. It seems clear that the legislature was not intending to depart from the precepts of the commonly understood meaning of "coercion" and to redefine it to include both free will decisions and compelled decisions.. The interpretation urged by the employees seems at variance with the stated goal of the legislature and the Gender Bias Com- mission. Since there is no cause of action provided for one who makes a reasoned and voluntary exercise of their free will to enter or continue in the profession solely for financial rewards (assuming "coercion" is given the definition more consistent with its com- monly accepted meaning and assuming that my in- terpretation of legislative intent is correct), coercion becomes the critical issue in the trial of such action. The interrogatories propounded by defendants ap- pear relevant to the issue of coercion. 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. hup://web2.westlaw.corn/print/printstream.aspx?sriSplit&prft=HTMLE&i fm=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221709 Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 Peg % 8 703 So.2d 1076 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Ha. L. Weekly D169 (Cite as: 703 Soled 1076) This is a case of first impression based on a relat- ively new statute. As indicated, the legislative his- tory of the new law suggests that the statute is de- signed to assist those who were forced to enter prostitution in order to keep a roof over their heads or food on their table. It does not appear to be in- tended to aid those who voluntarily enter the pro- fession in order to drive a Mercedes instead of a Ford. The limited record before us indicates that even beginning employees of the defendants (those who do not have an established clientele) bring in $700 a day and can keep 50% of their earnings. Based on a five-day work week, this would reflect an income of $87,500 a year even with a two week vacation. And the employees herein are not begin- ners. There is no indication that the legislature intended to legalize prostitution or to make it a respectable profession. It merely intended to place the prosti- tute on the same footing with the client and the "pimp." If a prostitute voluntarily makes the de- cision to participate, free from force, intimidation, or disadvantageous circumstance, then he or she is on the same footing as the other participants and should be treated the same. Although it might well serve a legitimate public purpose to permit the cannibalistic demise of such enterprises (and I am not unsympathetic with this view), that does not appear to be the policy behind the current statute. Therefore, in cases where coer- cion is not present (and this may or may not be one), the court should continue its tradition of not interceding in civil conflicts involving transactions that are either illegal or are against public policy. See Wechsler v. Novak, 157 Fla. 703, 26 So.2d 884 (1946); Thomas v. Rainier. 462 So.2d 1157, 1160 (Ha. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1985) ("An action may lie for interference with an unenforceable contract and even perhaps a void- able contract. No such cause of action lies for inter- ference with a contract void as against public policy (anther's representation of a client obtained by a doctor/lawyer's illegal personal injury solicitation Page 8 in the hospital) and which makes one who is a party thereto, as the appellant in the instant case, guilty of a criminal act for entering into such an agree- mem.") We are not asked in this proceeding to rule on the admissibility of the discovered information as evid- ence at the trial of this cause. We are to determine only if the information might lead to admissible evidence. Even *1083 though we deny the Writ I suggest we certify the following question: DOES ONE, FREE FROM FORCE, INTIMIDA- TION, OR DISADVANTAGEOUS CIRCUM- STANCE, WHO MAKES A REASONED DE- CISION TO BECOME OR REMAIN A PROSTI- TUTE OR TO SHARE THE PROCEEDS THEREOF BECAUSE OF A PROMISE OF A GREATER FINANCIAL REWARD HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION 796.09(1). FLORIDA STATUTES? ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING, FOR CLARI- FICATION, FOR CERTIFICATION, AND FOR RE- HEARING EN BANC W. SHARP, Judge. Petitioners Balas and Shumate have filed motions for rehearing, clarification and certification. We deny the motions in full except for one regard. We delete the sentence in the last full paragraph of the opinion which reads: -These other causes of action carry no such protection from discovery." Motion for Clarification GRANTED as stated above; Motion for Rehearing and Certification DENIED. HARRIS and THOMPSON. JJ., concur. Fla.App. 5 Dist..1997. Balas v. Ruzzo 703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly O2375. 23 Ma. L. Weekly D169 END OF DOCUMENT CI 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?sv—Split&prftr-HTMLE&ifm=NotSet&mt... 3/26/2009 EFTA00221710