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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document545 Filed 12/15/21 Page5of9 of a payout from the EVCP.” (Def. Letter at 4). This argument does not demonstrate relevance for two reasons. First, that articulation of bias matters only insofar as Carolyn was aware of the date the EVCP began accepting claims when she decided to cooperate with the Government. But she testified that she was not aware of that fact, and none of Scarola’s anticipated testimony would contradict Carolyn’s testimony on that point. (Tr. 1683). This bias theory accordingly has no factual predicate. Second, even if the defendant’s timeline testimony did go to bias in some way, the additional facts the defense would elicit from Scarola do not. For instance, Carolyn testified that she was largely out of touch between 2007 and July 2020, notwithstanding emails forwarded by Scarola, as noted above. Nothing about that timeline changes if the jury learns that the Government gave Scarola the contact information for an agent in February 2020. And if it did, it would serve simply as an end-run around the information the defendant would prefer to elicit, but which is protected by privilege: the substance of Scarola and Carolyn’s conversations about the EVCP and cooperation with the Government. Finally, even if there were some probative value to those details, it is substantially outweighed by the prejudice and jury confusion associated with calling Carolyn’s counsel to the stand. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Imposing such an obligation on Scarola would have an immediate chilling effect on Carolyn and Scarola’s attorney-client relationship, and it would confuse the jury by suggesting they should infer the existence and substance of privileged conversations for which there is no evidence. Whether or not Scarola testifies as the defendant suggests, there will be no evidence from which the jury can properly conclude that Scarola had any particular conversation with Carolyn on any topic. DOJ-OGR- 00008378