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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document600_ Filed 02/11/22 Page 25 of 37 Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because they subject a person to punishment for a single crime more than once. United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Chacko, 169 F.3d at 145); see also United States y. Colton, 231 F.3d 890, 910 (4% Cir. 2000) (“T]he principle danger created by multiplicity is that a defendant will receive multiple punishments for a single offense.”’). The offense in a charge of conspiracy is “the agreement or confederation of the conspirators to commit one or more unlawful acts.” Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (quoting (Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942)). Therefore, “[a] single agreement to commit several crimes constitutes one conspiracy,” but “multiple agreements to commit separate crimes constitute multiple conspiracies.” Jd. (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570- 71 (1989). In determining whether a defendant engaged in a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, the focus must be “on what agreement, if any, the jury could reasonably have found to exist vis-a-vis each defendant.” /d. (quoting United States v. Johansen, 56 F.3d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1995). When an accused is charged with two or more conspiracies in violation of the same statutory provision—in this case, the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371—the Second Circuit has adopted a multifactor test for determining whether the conspiracies amount to the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. These factors include: (1) the criminal offenses charged in successive indictments; (2) the overlap of participants; (3) the overlap of time; (4) the similarity of operation; (5) the existence of common overt acts; (6) the geographic scope of the alleged conspiracies or location where overt acts occurred; (7) common objectives; and (8) the degree of interdependence between alleged distinct conspiracies. 20 DOJ-OGR-00008949