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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document621 Filed 02/25/22 Page 27 of51 offense charged in another count.” United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 660, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Chacko, 169 F.3d at 146). With respect to conspiracy counts, if the two counts charge distinct conspiracies, “there is no double jeopardy problem regardless of an overt act or other evidentiary overlap.” Estrada, 320 F.3d at 180. In the Second Circuit, courts apply the factors set forth in United States v. Korfant to determine whether two conspiracy counts are distinct. /d. at 180-81 (citing United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985)). The factors include “the criminal offenses charged, overlap of participants, overlap of time, similarity of operation, common overt acts, geographic scope, common objectives, and degree of interdependence.” United States v. Guzman, 7 F. App’x 45, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Korfant, 771 F.2d at 662); Estrada, 320 F.3d at 181. eee When applying the Korfant factors, the Second Circuit has emphasized that “‘no dominant factor or single touchstone determines whether’ the compared conspiracies are in law and fact the same.” Jd. (quoting United States v. Macchia, 35 F.3d 662, 668 (2d Cir. 1994)). Moreover, “[a]t a certain level of generality,’ the fact that two conspiracies ‘overlap with respect to a number of characteristics, including time frame, geographic locale, participants, and criminal objective’ does not negate the existence of two conspiracies if ‘[t]here exist sufficient distinctions between the schemes charged.” Guzman, 7 F. App’x at 55 (quoting Macchia, 35 F.3d at 668). B. Discussion Counts Three and Five charged different offenses. The Court should reject the defendant’s multiplicity claim and enter judgment on Counts Three and Five. 26 DOJ-OGR-00009589