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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 34 of 66 intentional, are simply factors to be considered in this latter determination of actual bias.” Id. “One easily can imagine cases in which a prospective juror provides what he subjectively believes to be an honest answer, yet that same answer is objectively incorrect and therefore suggests that the individual would be a biased juror in the particular case.” Id. at 559. The Second Circuit adopted this reading of McDonough, endorsing the view expressed by Justice Brennan (and shared by Justice Blackmun) that an intentionally false answer 1s not a prerequisite to obtaining a new trial. United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1993) (“We read this multi-part test as governing not only inadvertent nondisclosures but also nondisclosures or misstatements that were deliberate.”); id. at 68 (adopting Justice Brennan’s reasoning). Accordingly, in the Second Circuit, “a party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror’s voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 303 (2d Cir. 2006). Of course, individuals cannot be allowed to lie their way onto a jury. Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo concluded: “If the answers to the questions [during voir dire] are willfully evasive or knowingly untrue, the talesman, when accepted, 1s a juror in name only .. . His relation to the court and to the parties is tainted in its origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.” Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933). “[A] juror who lies [his] way onto a jury is not really a juror at all; [he is an interloper akin ‘to a stranger who sneaks into the jury room.’” Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d DOJ-OGR-00009726