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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 40 of 66 that occurred at different times and places, bring it together, and construct what feels like a recollection. TR at 2427. Given Juror No. 50’s personal experience and belief about memory and its reliability, there was no way he could fairly evaluate Ms. Maxwell’s challenge to the credibility of her accusers’ memories or the expert testimony of Dr. Loftus.'* Several decisions support this conclusion. In Sampson v. United States, for example, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to order a new penalty- phase hearing in a death penalty case after a juror falsely denied, among other things, having been a victim of a crime. 724 F.3d at 154, 162. In fact, however, the juror repeatedly had been menaced by her husband with a shotgun. /d. at 168. But because the juror had not told the truth during voir dire, she was seated on a jury in a case involving a bank robbery in which the defendant threatened bank tellers at gunpoint. /d. “These parallels,” the Court said, “raise a serious concern as to whether an ordinary person in [the juror’s] shoes would be able to disregard her own experiences in evaluating the evidence.” Jd. To be sure, the juror in Sampson did not limit her false answers to a single question. She also answered falsely to several other questions during voir dire, some material and some not. /d. at 162-63, 166. A combination of factors led the First Circuit to affirm the order for a new penalty-phase hearing. /d. at 168. Here, Juror No. 50’s false Juror No. 50’s confidence in his memory is not necessarily a predictor of the memory’s reliability. As Dr. Loftus testified, “when you have post-event suggestion or intervention, people get very confident about their wrong answers, and you can see that even wrong answers or false information, false memories can be expressed with a high degree of confidence.” TR at 2430. 33 DOJ-OGR- 00009732