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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 45 of 66 district court did not err in inferring bias. /d. at 47-48. “Given the similarity of Juror No. 7’s structuring activity to the conduct alleged against appellant Devery in this case, it was reasonable for Judge Preska to conclude that the average person in Juror No. 7’s position might have felt personally threatened.” Jd. at 48. Although the Court in Torres declined to define the “precise scope of a trial judge’s discretion to infer bias,” Judge Calabresi further explained: It is enough for the present to note that cases in which a juror has engaged in activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial are particularly apt. The exercise of the trial judge’s discretion to grant challenges for cause on the basis of inferred bias is especially appropriate in such situations. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). Just as it is “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror has engaged in “activities that closely approximate those of the defendant on trial,” so too is it “especially appropriate” for a court to infer bias when a potential juror has been subject to conduct “that closely approximate[d] [that] of the defendant on trial.” See id. In such a case, there 1s just too great a risk that such a juror will not be able to decide the case purely based on the applicable law and the evidence or lack of evidence, even though that inability may be unconscious. This is one such case. 3. Actual bias “Actual bias is ‘bias in fact’—the existence of a state of mind that leads to an inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality.” Torres, 128 F.3d at 43 (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936)). “A juror is found by the judge to be partial either because the juror admits partiality, or the judge finds actual partiality 38 DOJ-OGR- 00009737