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Case 1:20-cr-00330-PAE Document 642 Filed 03/11/22 Page 46 of 66 based upon the juror’s voir dire answers.” /d. (citing United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) (actual bias 1s “based upon express proof, e.g., by a voir dire admission by the prospective juror of a state of mind prejudicial to a party’s interest’’); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge’s responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court’s instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled.’’)). This Court need not decide whether Juror No. 50 was actually biased, since this Court can and should imply and infer bias. Assuming this Court holds an evidentiary hearing at which Juror No. 50 is compelled to give truthful answers to the questions he would have been asked if he had not falsely responded to the questionnaire, Ms. Maxwell reserves the right to argue that Juror No. 50 was actually biased. C. Juror No. 50’s answers to Questions 25 and 48 were intentionally false. Ms. Maxwell does not need to prove that Juror No. 50’s voir dire answers were intentionally false. As explained above, she need only prove “first, that the juror’s voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.” Stewart, 433 F.3d at 303. Nevertheless, assuming this Court concludes that Ms. Maxwell must prove Juror No. 50 intentionally misled the Court in falsely answering Questions 25 and 48, Ms. Maxwell has easily met that burden. There are at least six reasons to believe Juror No. 50 acted intentionally. First, this Court need only watch the video of Juror No. 50 being confronted with his false answers to appreciate that he acted intentionally. Juror No. 50’s face immediately flushed and ay DOJ-OGR- 00009738